Indus Waters Treaty and Simla Agreement in Abeyance: Fallout of the 2025 Pahalgam Attack

The Indus Waters Treaty (1960) and the Simla Agreement (1972) have long underpinned India-Pakistan relations, governing water sharing and conflict resolution. In April 2025, a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, killed 26 civilians on a tourist bus, triggering a severe diplomatic crisis. India blamed Pakistan-based militants, convened a security review, and took retaliatory measures. In this context, New Delhi announced a suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, while Islamabad declared the Simla Agreement “in abeyance.” This overview examines the origins and provisions of both pacts, the sequence of actions after Pahalgam, and the broader implications for bilateral ties.

Indus Waters Treaty: Origins and Key Provisions

• Historical Context: Signed on 19 September 1960 in Karachi, the Indus Waters Treaty was a landmark agreement between India and Pakistan, mediated by the World Bank.
  • It emerged after Partition disputes (1947-48) over the Indus basin rivers. Both countries sought a clear division of water resources after severe flooding and droughts.
  • Negotiations led by the World Bank’s Indus River Waters Committee (chaired by Artur Stabell) involved over a dozen drafts.
  • Key signatories were Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. It took effect on 1 April 1960, creating a durable legal framework for shared river management.
• River Allocation: The Treaty divided the six main rivers of the Indus basin between the two countries.
  • Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej): Allocated to India for unrestricted use. India gained control of ~41 billion cubic meters (BCM) of annual flow from these eastern tributaries.
  • Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab): Allocated to Pakistan. Pakistan thus received roughly 70% of total Indus basin flow (~99 BCM per year).
  • India retained limited rights on Western Rivers (domestic, non-consumptive uses like power generation), but must not significantly reduce flows to Pakistan.
• Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): The Treaty established a bilateral oversight body with two commissioners (one from each country).
  • The PIC meets annually (alternating host countries) to exchange data on river flows and discuss upcoming projects.
  • It facilitates routine cooperation: India provides Pakistan with three-month forecasts of river flow (important for agriculture planning).
  • The Commission can form sub-groups to address technical issues, which historically has defused tensions over proposed dams or canals.
• Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms: Detailed procedures handle disagreements before they escalate.
  • If the PIC cannot resolve a dispute, a Neutral Expert (for technical disagreements) or Arbitration Court (for legal questions) can be appointed, both under World Bank auspices.
  • Notable cases: In 2007-2010 disputes over the Baglihar Dam (Indus, India) and Kishanganga/Neelum-Jhelum projects (Chenab/Jhelum) went to neutral experts, who largely upheld India’s designs with minor modifications to ensure flows.
  • These mechanisms have largely worked: most complaints over three decades were settled via treaty procedures rather than conflict.
• Infrastructure Projects: The IWT enabled major irrigation and hydropower works on both sides.
  • Pakistan built the Mangla (completed 1967) and Tarbela (1976) dams on Western rivers, expanding storage for irrigation and power (Tarbela is one of the world’s largest earth-fill dams).
  • India completed the Bhakra Nangal dam (1954) and Beas projects on Eastern rivers, vastly increasing its irrigation area.
  • The World Bank provided financial and technical assistance for these projects (the Indus Basin Project), ensuring treaty compliance and compensating Pakistan for the eastern river loss via a development fund.
• Enduring Success: The IWT is often cited as one of the most successful water-sharing agreements globally.
  • Remarkably, it survived even during wars between India and Pakistan (1965, 1971, 1999) and crisis moments. Both sides continued data exchange and project coordination.
  • It has no fixed expiration date. India and Pakistan assumed it would hold indefinitely. The 2025 suspension is the first time India has invoked a break from the Treaty.
  • The Treaty’s success rests on detailed provisions and neutral oversight, which have generally prevented water issues from sparking war.

Simla Agreement: Origins and Key Clauses

• Background: The Simla Agreement was signed on 2 July 1972 (sealed 7 August 1972) by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan.
  • It followed the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which resulted in the independence of Bangladesh. The war had ended with a ceasefire on 17 December 1971 along the old ceasefire line in Jammu & Kashmir.
  • The Agreement’s purpose was to normalize relations after the conflict, prevent future wars, and set a framework for peaceful settlement of differences.
• Key Provisions: The Simla Agreement laid out several core principles to govern bilateral relations.
  • Bilateral Negotiations: It stipulated that all issues (including Kashmir) would be settled “by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.” External intervention (e.g., UN, third parties) was effectively ruled out. This marked a shift from earlier UN-mediated approaches.
  • Line of Control (LoC): It converted the Dec 1971 ceasefire line into the new Line of Control, with neither side attempting unilateral change. Article II noted that pending final settlement, “neither side shall unilaterally alter that line.” This froze territorial positions: India held ~one-third of J&K, Pakistan ~two-thirds (including what is now Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan).
  • Sovereignty and Non-Interference: Both governments pledged to respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internal affairs. They agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. This included a commitment to discourage hostile propaganda and encourage friendly information.
  • Peace and Normalization: The preamble expressed resolution to end conflict and establish durable peace. Articles provided for repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees (completed by 1974). They also recognized the UN Charter principles and called for step-by-step confidence-building measures in trade, communication, and culture.
• Post-Agreement Context: Simla served as the foundation of bilateral engagement, with lasting effects and challenges.
  • It effectively sidelined the United Nations; India argued the LoC (not the earlier Karachi Agreement line) was the only recognized demarcation, thus making the UN Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) obsolete. Pakistan, however, continues to host UNMOGIP.
  • The Agreement did not create a permanent treaty body; its enforcement relied entirely on mutual adherence. When relations frayed, implementation lagged.
  • Over decades, the Simla framework saw mixed outcomes: it prevented immediate resumption of war after 1971, but bilateral dialogue often stalled. Kashmir remained unresolved, and several flashpoints (e.g. Siachen in 1984, Kargil in 1999) demonstrated Simla’s limits. However, both sides repeatedly referenced it as the agreed basis for talks when tensions eased.
• Legacy: In theory, Simla turned India-Pak issues into strictly a bilateral affair. India maintains that under Simla, Kashmir is solely an issue to be resolved by India and Pakistan, not by UN resolutions. Pakistan contends Simla did not negate earlier UN mandates.
  • The Agreement reaffirmed a ceasefire in 1971 but provided no final status solution for Kashmir.
  • Its emphasis on bilateralism continues to influence diplomatic stances: during any crisis, India stresses negotiating directly with Pakistan (citing Simla), while Pakistan sometimes appeals to international forums as well, citing pre-1972 UN resolutions.
  • Ratification came in mid-1972 (India in Aug, Pakistan in July), but since then neither side formally renounced it, even though clauses were often violated in spirit.

Pahalgam Terror Attack 2025: Incident and Attribution

• Attack Details: On 23 April 2025, militants ambushed a tourist bus in Pahalgam, a hill resort in south Kashmir, killing 26 civilians and wounding others.
  • The victims were mainly pilgrims visiting a local shrine; most of those killed were men from various Indian states. A teenage tourist from Nepal was among the dead.
  • Eyewitnesses reported that attackers first separated women from men, sparing the women while executing the male tourists. This brutal method shocked the nation.
  • The scale of violence made it India’s deadliest civilian massacre since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The victims’ bodies and shattered buses drew front-page headlines and national mourning.
• Initial Blame and Claims: The Indian government quickly blamed Pakistan-based militants, especially the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) group, for orchestrating the attack.
  • Officials reported that at least two of the assailants escaped back across the Line of Control towards Pakistan-held Kashmir. Intelligence pointed to JeM cadres having infiltrated the region.
  • India identified three suspects (including two Pakistani nationals by name) behind the attack. Prime Minister Modi stated that evidence would be shared, though Pakistan demanded proof.
  • Pakistan’s Foreign Office denied any involvement. Islamabad condemned the killings as “inhuman,” but rejected India’s allegations as baseless, saying Pakistan had itself been a victim of terrorism.
• National Reaction: The attack triggered an immediate wave of outrage and grief across India.
  • Political leaders from all major parties expressed unity in condemning the atrocity. Prime Minister Modi described it as an “attack on the soul of India.” Thousands of citizens lit candles and offered prayers in solidarity with the victims.
  • In Parliament and media, there were demands for a forceful response. Some opposition figures urged a tough stance against Pakistan. Others called for restraint to avoid wider conflict.
  • Social media and news channels were dominated by coverage of the tragedy and speculation on links to Pakistan. Analysts warned this crisis could overshadow other regional concerns if mishandled.
• Connecting Terror and Treaties: The Pahalgam attack immediately impacted India’s view of long-standing agreements with Pakistan.
  • Security advisors argued this cross-border terrorism required not just military action but diplomatic pressure. Moves against issues like water sharing (Indus Treaty) and bilateral protocols (Simla) surfaced in these discussions.
  • The coincidence of this attack with upcoming elections in India’s Uttar Pradesh state (held early 2025) likely increased political sensitivity. Analysts noted that any government action would be watched as a test of resolve.
  • In summary, the Pahalgam massacre was a critical flashpoint that quickly reframed Indo-Pak relations, turning domestic outrage into international policy changes.

India’s Response: Diplomatic and Treaty Actions

• Summoning Diplomats: Immediately after the attack, India summoned Pakistan’s Deputy High Commissioner (working Pakistan’s charge d’affaires) to lodge a strong protest.
  • An all-party meeting of Indian Parliament was called, in which the Prime Minister briefed leaders on the attack and response options. This meeting aimed to build national consensus on action.
  • The Foreign Secretary publicly declared that the incident had clear cross-border elements, referring to it as a “proxy war” tactic by Pakistan-based groups. India called for Pakistan to act against terrorists.
• Immediate Measures: The government imposed several diplomatic and economic counter-measures against Pakistan:
  • Visa and Consular Actions: All visa services for Pakistani nationals were suspended, and existing visas cancelled. High-level exchanges were postponed; India asked Pakistan to reduce diplomatic staff.
  • Border and Trade Closure: The Wagah-Attari land border (major trade and transit point) was shut down temporarily. Cross-border trade (already minimal since 2019) was further restricted, signaling a chill in relations.
  • Airspace and Flights: (Later, Pakistan closed its airspace to Indian planes; India responded by increasing flights via air routes bypassing Pakistan.)
• Suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty: On 23-24 April 2025, the Indian government announced a suspension (or “temporary break”) of the Indus Waters Treaty obligations.
  • India declared it would halt all data sharing of river flow information with Pakistan and freeze any new water projects on the Western rivers pending Pakistan’s action on terrorism.
  • The Jal Shakti Minister, on record, vowed that “not a single drop of water” would flow to Pakistan until the treaty was restored. He clarified that ongoing projects (like Kishanganga, Dulhasti dams) would continue under domestic law, but any additional allocations would be withheld.
  • This was a landmark move: never before had India suspended the IWT since its signing in 1960 . It marked water not just as a resource issue but as a security card. India linked water flow to national security concerns.
  • At the same time, India retained legal cover: the IWT lacks a straightforward exit clause, so India termed its actions as “suspension” of obligations rather than formally abrogating the treaty.
• Public Messaging: Indian officials emphasized that these steps were a proportional response to Pakistan’s alleged role in Kashmir militancy.
  • Prime Minister Modi and other leaders stated India would use all peaceful means to punish the attackers and those who harbored them. Modi emphasized resolve (“We will pursue them to the ends of the earth”) without naming Pakistan directly.
  • Home Minister Amit Shah warned of “serious consequences” if further attacks occurred. The narrative was that India was forced to leverage unconventional tools (like water resources) since conventional retaliation (e.g. military strike) risked wider war.
• Military Posture: Alongside diplomacy, India raised military readiness along the border and the Kashmir Valley to deter any further attacks.
  • Security forces intensified anti-militant operations in Kashmir, and paramilitary deployments were bolstered.
  • Internationally, India reiterated it would respond firmly to terrorism but also aimed to keep the situation contained. India lobbied friendly nations (e.g., USA, EU) to condemn cross-border terror, aiming to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.
• Summary of Indian Stance: India’s response combined political, economic, and security measures:
  • It downgraded bilateral engagement and escalated costs for Pakistan without crossing into outright war.
  • Suspending the IWT was the boldest step, effectively using a resource treaty as leverage. Even though actual water stoppage would take time, the symbolic impact was immediate.
  • Government spokespeople argued that Pakistan’s failure to curb groups like JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba had made the continuation of such treaties untenable.

Pakistan’s Response: Countermeasures and Simla “Abeyance”

• Denial and Counter-Accusations: Pakistan’s government flatly denied involvement in the Pahalgam attack.
  • Officials suggested the incident was used by India to tarnish Pakistan’s image. Pakistani military spokespersons asserted that allegations without concrete evidence were unacceptable.
  • Pakistan demanded that India share actionable intelligence. It claimed that if cross-border fire occurred, it was due to Indian forces, citing instances of ceasefire violations along the Line of Control.
• Retaliatory Measures: Islamabad took reciprocal steps to exert pressure on India:
  • Airspace Ban: Pakistan closed its airspace to Indian airlines, forcing flights to take longer routes via third countries. This move disrupted travel and trade for India.
  • Trade Suspension: It announced a suspension of all trade, including indirect trade via Afghanistan and other South Asian routes. Pakistan nullified India’s Most Favoured Nation trade status, further crippling the already minimal trade (around $2 billion before 2019).
  • Visa Restrictions: Pakistani visas for Indians were cancelled, and the visa-on-arrival scheme was revoked. The Indus Highway border at Wagah was closed to all civilian traffic, mirroring India’s closures.
• Simla Agreement in Abeyance: The most significant Pakistani pronouncement was holding the Simla Agreement “in abeyance.”
  • On 24 April 2025, Pakistan’s Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement saying Islamabad would not consider itself bound by the Simla Agreement or any other bilateral pact until India ceased “fomenting terrorism in Pakistan.”
  • This declaration meant that Pakistan was effectively suspending its commitment to Simla’s clauses (bilateral talks, respect for LoC, etc.) as long as it saw India as violating Pakistan’s sovereignty by supporting militancy.
  • By placing Simla in abeyance, Pakistan signaled that it might revert to international avenues (e.g. UN forums) to address Kashmir if necessary, since its pledge to resolve issues bilaterally was now contingent on Indian behavior.
• Reaction to IWT Suspension: Pakistan also harshly rejected India’s move on the water treaty:
  • The Foreign Ministry called India’s suspension of the IWT “a violation of an international treaty” and a threat to regional stability.
  • Pakistani officials warned that India had no right to unilaterally alter water sharing, given that rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty are lifelines for its agriculture and power.
  • Leaders like Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and former PM Imran Khan publicly warned of severe consequences if India cut off water: Bhutto even used hyperbole (“blood will flow if India stops the water”) to underline how critical the Indus waters are to Pakistan.
• Domestic Impact in Pakistan: The actions stoked nationalist sentiment within Pakistan.
  • Political parties largely rallied behind the government in denouncing India’s “aggressive moves.” Protests were reported outside the Indian embassy in Islamabad, while Pakistani media framed the issue as existential.
  • Critics noted Pakistan’s economy (already stressed) would suffer from trade losses and the uncertainty around water. Farmers, who depend on Indus irrigation (85-90% of crops such as wheat, rice, cotton come from these rivers, faced anxiety over future shortages.
  • In the military’s view, the water and Simla announcements put pressure back on India, but also risked international censure for seeming inflexibility.
• International Signalling: Pakistan made clear it viewed these bilateral treaties as security matters:
  • By linking Simla to terrorism accusations, Pakistan shifted the framing of Kashmir talks to India’s actions. It indicated that without addressing its core grievance (militancy), there could be no dialogue.
  • In parallel, Pakistan sought to engage global institutions: it hinted the World Bank (as treaty depositary) could intervene if India violated IWT terms. It might seek arbitration or mediation if flows were actually affected.

Comparative Analysis: Indus Waters Treaty vs Simla Agreement

• Though both are bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) and the Simla Agreement (1972) differ fundamentally in focus, scope, and enforcement. The following chart highlights their key contrasts:

• This comparison shows IWT is a technical, resource-focused treaty with binding legal procedures, whereas Simla is a political-peace agreement. IWT’s third-party (World Bank) role gives it international backing, while Simla relies entirely on mutual trust. In essence, IWT is about managing shared natural resources, whereas Simla is about managing conflict and territory. Their current suspension reveals these contrasts: a breach of IWT threatens physical resources, while ignoring Simla undermines diplomatic processes.
• Implication of Differences: The resilience of IWT historically has owed much to its detailed rules and neutral oversight. Simla’s fate, by contrast, has depended on the state of overall relations. Now, IWT is officially paused, and Simla is effectively frozen, showing that even well-established frameworks can be sidelined when security crises erupt.

Implications and Future Outlook

• Risk of Escalation: Holding these foundational agreements in abeyance has escalated tensions to unprecedented levels. Analysts warn this could evolve into a broader conflict domain:
  • Water Security vs. National Security: Pakistan’s water experts note that if India fully diverts western river flows, Pakistan might face severe irrigation deficits after a few years (its reservoirs can last roughly 3-4 years without new inflow). Given agriculture’s ~25% contribution to Pakistan’s GDP, any significant water shortage could spark economic and social unrest.
  • Bilateral Dialogue Halted: With Simla suspended, any high-level dialogue on Kashmir or other issues is stalled. Pakistan may turn to international courts or UN forums, while India insists on talks only under Simla. This deadlock increases the chance of unilateral actions or military skirmishes along the Line of Control.
• Domestic Calculations: Both governments are under pressure at home to appear strong.
  • In India, the ruling party has taken a hardline stance to satisfy public and political expectations of retribution. However, a prolonged conflict (economic or military) could incur costs (trade losses, investor wariness, regional instability).
  • In Pakistan, leadership can rally national unity by portraying India as aggressor. Yet failing to secure water would cause discontent among farmers and affect food security. Pakistan’s options include accelerating dam construction (e.g. Diamer-Bhasha, Mohmand) – projects India has long protested as treaty violations – but those take years to yield water.
• International Factors:
  • The World Bank, as depositary of the IWT, may urge both sides to resume talks under treaty provisions. It could facilitate arbitration if invoked. However, India’s stance frames it as a self-defense act, complicating third-party roles.
  • Major powers (US, China) and neighbors are watching closely. They generally prefer stability between two nuclear states. Diplomatic intervention might come if the situation worsens.
  • Climate change also looms: both countries recognize that Himalayan river flows may vary. An enduring break in cooperation could hinder regional water management efforts, affecting millions.
• Historical Precedents: Past crises offer some guidance. After the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India did not break the IWT; instead it used targeted strikes in Pakistan and global diplomacy. This time, Pakistan’s role in Pahalgam (claimed by India) is seen as an even larger attack on civilian tourists, pushing India to escalate differently.
  • The current measures are more symbolic than immediately destructive (e.g., no dams have been actually shut off yet). Yet they set dangerous precedents for using water and treaties as leverage.
• Path Ahead: Moving forward, several scenarios are possible:
  • De-escalation: Diplomatic backchannel talks could lead to incremental restoration. For example, Pakistan might share evidence on militancy to justify reinstating IWT, or India might demand terror suspects for talks. Compromise language could emerge, especially if other crises (economic woes, COVID-like pandemics) demand cooperation.
  • Prolonged Standoff: If neither side backs down, normalcy talks remain frozen. Pakistan’s agriculture might push it to seek emergency international mediation on water. India might go ahead with new hydro projects, citing natural resources rights. The zero-sum approach would continue feeding animosity.
  • Wildcard – Regional Involvement: China, a close ally of Pakistan, might weigh in given shared interests in the Indus (though flows across the Line of Actual Control are unaffected by IWT). Any hint of international arbitration beyond the World Bank could involve China or other neighbors, further complicating the original treaty mandates.
• Broader Implications: This situation illustrates how treaty law, resource management, and geopolitics intertwine. The Indus Waters Treaty was once a model of cross-border cooperation, and Simla a cornerstone of peace efforts. Their suspension raises questions about the efficacy of bilateral pacts under stress. It highlights the need for considering security, economic, and humanitarian angles when evaluating policy shifts. Observers must watch how India and Pakistan balance national pride with pragmatic needs: renewed dialogue and legal recourse (e.g. neutral experts, international watercourse principles) could help avert a full crisis. Alternatively, failure to re-engage might harden positions on both sides, undermining regional stability in the long run.

Conclusion

The April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack has profoundly strained India-Pakistan relations, drawing two fundamental treaties into its vortex. The Indus Waters Treaty – a pillar of water security – and the Simla Agreement – the bedrock of bilateral peace – are now effectively on hold. India’s move to suspend the IWT and Pakistan’s decision to hold Simla in abeyance mark a sharp departure from decades of treaty-based engagement. This escalation underscores how issues of terrorism, water resources, and diplomacy have become intertwined. In the short term, it raises the stakes along the Line of Control and in water management. Long-term repercussions could include irreversible damage to trust and cooperation. Ultimately, the crisis will test whether diplomacy and international mechanisms can be revived to reconcile conflicting demands.

Practice Questions

• How does the Indus Waters Treaty differ from the Simla Agreement in objectives and enforcement mechanisms, and why is this relevant to the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis? (250 words)
• Explain the diplomatic and security implications of India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty and Pakistan’s decision to hold the Simla Agreement in abeyance. (250 words)