Pahalgam Attack Explained: Why Kashmir Remains a Target of Sectarian Violence

The 2025 Pahalgam attack took place on 22 April 2025 in Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir. In this massacre, five militants ambushed a group of Hindu pilgrims, using assault rifles (AK-47s, M4 carbines) to segregate and kill tourists. They reportedly asked victims to recite an Islamic creed before opening fire, targeting male non-Muslim tourists. The attack left around 26 people dead and over 20 injured, making it the deadliest civilian terror attack in India since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. One Tamil teenager survived by pretending to be Muslim, and a local pony guide died confronting the attackers to save tourists. Security forces quickly imposed a lockdown in Pahalgam, deployed helicopters and tracked the militants into the forests. The perpetrators – identified as The Resistance Front (TRF), a Lashkar-e-Taiba offshoot – claimed responsibility. This shocking event prompted nationwide outrage: the Prime Minister announced swift action and victims’ families received compensation. In the aftermath, travel agents reported that nearly 90% of Kashmir tour bookings were cancelled amid panic, underscoring the immediate hit to tourism.

What Happened: The 2025 Pahalgam Attack

• On the afternoon of 22 April 2025, five gunmen attacked tourists in Baisaran Valley (a scenic meadow 7 km from Pahalgam). They came down from pine forests and opened fire on a group of pilgrims and tourists.
• The assailants separated men from women and children by asking for their religion, then shot the Hindu men at close range. At least 26 civilians (mostly Hindu pilgrims from Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Gujarat) were killed; more than 20 were injured.
• The attackers wore camouflage uniforms and used high-powered rifles. They filmed the massacre, later posting footage online to amplify fear. Witnesses recounted terrorists asking victims to recite the Islamic kalima; those who did were spared.
• A local youth riding a pony – Harpreet Singh, a guide – is said to have confronted one attacker, sacrificing himself to delay the assault and protect tourists. His bravery became emblematic of civilian courage.
• Within hours, security forces (Army, CRPF and police) secured the site. A lockdown was imposed in Pahalgam and nearby towns, while helicopters and drones searched the forests. The immediate response prioritized rescuing the wounded and identifying the victims.

Historical Context: Past Attacks in Pahalgam and Kashmir

• Longstanding insurgency: Since the late 1980s, Jammu & Kashmir has experienced a violent separatist insurgency, with militants (often Pakistan-backed) targeting Indian security forces and civilians alike.
• Sectarian violence: Historically, militants have targeted religious minorities. March 2000: The Chattisinghpora massacre in Anantnag district saw 36 Sikh villagers killed by militants. August 2000: A major attack on the Amarnath pilgrimage at Nunwan (near Pahalgam) killed 32 people (21 Hindu pilgrims, 7 local Muslims, 3 police). July 2001: Bomb blasts at Amarnath base camp (Sheshnag Lake) killed 13 pilgrims. These incidents showed a pattern of militants striking Hindu pilgrimage sites in the Valley.
• Recent attacks: In 2017, militants ambushed a bus of Amarnath pilgrims in Anantnag district, killing 8 Hindu pilgrims. In 2019, the Pulwama attack killed 40 CRPF soldiers (security forces) on a highway in Pulwama district. The Pahalgam attack is now the deadliest against civilians since Mumbai 2008, illustrating a persistent threat to soft targets.
• Parallel insurgencies: The Pahalgam incident echoes past tragedies like Nadimarg (2003), where Kashmiri Pandit families were massacred, and Kaluchak (2002), where militants attacked an army camp. These collectively underscore that Kashmir has suffered repeated terror strikes, often aimed at minorities or civilians to fuel fear and polarization.

Geography and Significance (Where)

• Pahalgam is a picturesque hill town (Anantnag district), known as the “Valley of Shepherds” and the gateway to the Amarnath shrine. It sits at ~2200 m elevation, surrounded by dense pine forests and mountains.
• Baisaran Valley (“Shepherd’s Meadow”) is a lush alpine meadow ~7 km north of Pahalgam. Only reachable by a 2-hour trek or horseback, it is a favorite spot for tourists and trekkers. Its remoteness means security coverage is thin (no roads, just mule tracks).
• Strategic location: Pahalgam’s role as a pilgrimage hub (30+ years of Amarnath Yatra routes) makes it symbolic. Militants have targeted this area to disrupt pilgrimage (seen as a sign of Hindu presence) and to inflict maximum psychological impact. The difficult terrain (steep slopes, forest canopy) provides hiding cover for infiltrators, complicating surveillance.
• Accessibility issues: The site’s isolation delayed reinforcements. Communications (cellphone, internet) are often patchy in these valleys. This geographical isolation contributed to the attackers’ ability to strike suddenly and vanish.

Timeline of the Attack (When)

• 22 April 2025, ~3:00 PM: Five militants emerge from forests in Baisaran, open fire on a group of ~65 pilgrims during a rest break. Over 30 villagers (pony operators and guides) were also present. Shooting lasts a few minutes before militants flee.
• Same afternoon: Local police report multiple civilian casualties. Pahalgam is immediately placed under curfew. Security forces (J&K Police, CRPF, Army) cordon off the area. News of the attack breaks on national media by evening.
• 23 April 2025: The bodies of victims are airlifted to Srinagar and then transported home; condolences are offered nationwide. The government identifies the assailants as members of the TRF militant outfit. Home Minister and Army chief address the press, announcing a “no leniency” policy for perpetrators. The Amarnath Yatra (due to resume soon) is temporarily suspended. The Indian Air Force mobilizes helicopters to chase militants into the rugged Pir Panjal Range.
• 24-25 April 2025: Intelligence reports suggest militants split into small groups to escape. Security forces conduct sweeps; a few suspected terrorists are killed or captured in subsequent skirmishes. Jammu & Kashmir government announces relief aid (e.g. ₹10 lakh ex-gratia per deceased). On the diplomatic front, India publicly blames Pakistan’s proxy war. Media reports note that India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty as a pressure tactic (reflecting diplomatic fallout from terror).
• Late April 2025: National discussions begin on security lapses and the impact of Jammu & Kashmir’s changed status (post-2019 abrogation of Article 370). Analysts compare this attack’s casualty figures to past incidents (e.g., noting “worst since 2008 Mumbai”). Life in Srinagar and Pahalgam returns to cautious normalcy under increased security presence.

Perpetrators and Tactics (Who & How)

• The Resistance Front (TRF): A shadow name for militants of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen, designated a terrorist group in India. TRF claimed the Pahalgam attack within 24 hours. Police reports confirm that the five gunmen were Kashmiri militants with overseas handlers. All wore military-pattern camouflage and carried standard assault rifles (AK-47, M4 carbines).
• Infiltration: The attackers likely crossed from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. They trekked through semi-inhabited forest routes to avoid main roads. Their movement exploited the pre-monsoon climate (light rains/cover). Locals later reported seeing unidentified trekkers days before the attack, suggesting militants scouted the tourist camp.
• Ambush tactics: Selecting mid-day (when guards are sparse), the militants surrounded the open meadow before opening fire. They systematically segregated victims by religion – a tactic of sectarian terror seen in past massacres (Chattisinghpora, Sheshnag). This indicates planning: ensuring maximum Hindu casualties.
• Weapon use: The attackers used automatic fire to cause instant panic, then moved among victims to finish off those down (reports say some fired at point-blank range). Witnesses noted bursts of 70+ rounds fired.
• Escape: After the attack, militants retreated swiftly on foot/horse into the forest. An army spokesperson later said they expected the fighters to hide in the upper reaches of the Pir Panjal mountains, with choppers and ground troops in pursuit.
• Social media warfare: Video from the attack was published by TRF, showing the militants smiling after the massacre. This was intended to propagate terror propaganda, suggesting organizational media-savviness.
• Profile of attackers: Intelligence suggests at least two were young locals (natives of South Kashmir) radicalized in recent years. The other three possibly Pakistani nationals or Kashmiris trained abroad. This hybrid profile (foreign trainers, local shooters) is typical of LeT-style operations.

Motivations and Ideology (Why)

• Sectarian agenda: The gunmen explicitly targeted Hindu pilgrims. TRF’s statement framed the attack as retaliation against perceived anti-Muslim policies. The motive was to instill fear in Kashmir’s Hindu minority (and discourage future pilgrimages).
• Political message: Militants claimed they wanted to “resist demographic changes” after Delhi revoked J&K’s special status (August 2019) and opened land for outsiders. Thus, the attack was meant as symbolic resistance to central government policies.
• Global jihad influence: Though TRF uses local slogans, its rhetoric aligns with Islamist militancy. The attackers likely saw themselves as part of a wider jihad, drawing from narratives used by groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda (extremist propaganda praising violence against civilians as “martyrdom operations”).
• Pakistani proxy war: Pakistan’s ISI has long supported anti-India militants. By targeting unarmed civilians, the TRF was furthering Pakistan’s strategy to internationalize Kashmir. Pakistan-backed groups use such atrocities to garner global headlines and pressure India.
• Tactical objective: Beyond ideology, such terror attacks aim to polarize communities. By massacring Hindu tourists, militants try to provoke anger and potentially communal riots, thereby undermining Kashmir’s pluralistic fabric. It’s a form of psychological warfare to show that “no place is safe.”
• Retaliation narrative: The attackers saw themselves as avenging historical grievances (e.g., 1990 expulsion of Pandits, or human rights abuses claimed by separatists). TRF’s channels explicitly mentioned “defending Islam in Kashmir,” suggesting a belief that violence would protect Muslim identity in the Valley.
• Marquee effect: A successful, high-casualty attack gives militant groups publicity and may help recruitment by portraying themselves as effective fighters. Claiming such a strike boosts TRF’s standing relative to rivals (e.g., Hizbul, Jaish) in the militant ecosystem.

Immediate Impact on Victims and Response

• Human cost: The victims were families on a pilgrimage trip. Among the dead were children and young adults (e.g., a newlywed Hindu couple from Maharashtra, a family of four from Tamil Nadu). The sudden, brutal nature left survivors traumatized. One injured pilgrim was quoted saying he ran for cover as his friends fell around him.
• Heroism and tragedy: The pony operator who fought an attacker is being hailed as a hero; his body was cremated with honors. Survivors described hearing a teenage boy calmly say the kalima (confession of faith) to convince militants to spare him. These personal stories captured national attention.
• Local solidarity: Immediately after the attack, Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir jointly condemned the violence. Shops and schools remained closed on 23-24 April as a mark of respect. Social media saw hashtags like #PrayForKashmir trending, reflecting widespread grief. Candlelight vigils and prayers were held in Srinagar, Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai.
• Government action: Prime Minister Modi promised that “justice will be done.” The Home Minister chaired an emergency security review. Ex-gratia compensation (e.g. ₹10 lakh from central govt per deceased) was announced; state governments and political leaders also offered aid. Hospitals in Jammu and Srinagar mobilized blood donations for the injured.
• Security clampdown: Roads into Pahalgam were sealed; all tourist lodgings were searched. Spontaneous curfews were imposed in some villages to prevent panic. The Amarnath Yatra routes were fortified with extra soldiers. For a period, Kashmir’s entire airspace and borders with POK were put under heightened watch.
• Media and perception: Graphic images from the site led to shock waves across India. Opposition politicians and minority groups immediately cited the tragedy in debates on national security. The TV coverage emphasized that unarmed civilians had been targeted, raising questions about the adequacy of existing security measures.
• Tourism sector: Travel companies across India reported that nearly 9 out of 10 tourists withdrew Kashmir trip plans (due to fear). Local hoteliers described a “free fall” in bookings overnight. The Indian Railways and some airlines offered flexible refunds. Kashmir’s tourism minister urged calm, but admitted losses would be heavy if perceptions did not change soon.

Economic and Tourism Consequences

• Tourism downturn: Jammu & Kashmir’s economy relies heavily on tourism (millions of visitors annually pre-pandemic). After the Pahalgam attack, Delhi travel agents noted cancellations of about 90% of planned Kashmir tours in the coming weeks. Many travelers booked in advance (for summer vacations or Amarnath season) opted out immediately.
• Local revenue loss: Pahalgam’s residents depend on visitors for income (lodges, shops, mule rentals). With spring arrivals halted, daily incomes plunged to near-zero overnight. Hotel owners estimated losses of lakhs of rupees per day. For example, if Pahalgam normally hosts ~3,000 tourists daily in peak season, the cancellations could mean a loss exceeding ₹10–20 crore per week for that local economy.
• Historical drop: Similar effects were seen after past attacks. For instance, following the 2000 Amarnath massacre, pilgrim traffic dropped by 15–20% that season. Pilgrimage numbers often take years to recover after a major strike.
• Investment concerns: News of the massacre raises concerns among outside investors. Authorities have been trying to attract business (tourism infrastructure projects, ski resorts, luxury hotels) but such incidents introduce risk premiums.
• Insurance and costs: Insurers may hike premiums for travel to conflict zones. Tour operators might demand higher fees for additional security. These costs could deter budget travelers, shifting the market composition.
• Government mitigation: To counter the slump, authorities announced travel subsidies and security assurances. The Ministry of Tourism launched a campaign highlighting “safe spots” in J&K. Compensation to victims’ families and hero families (like the slain pony rider) was publicized to show concern. Officials arranged alternative pilgrimage sites for Hindus (e.g., other shrines) to placate anger, though none carry the same significance as Amarnath.

Security Challenges and Countermeasures

• Difficult terrain: The Pahalgam region’s rugged geography (steep hills, dense forests) creates blind spots for surveillance. Traditional checkpoints can only monitor roads, but attackers used footpaths. Ensuring a 24/7 watch on every forest trail is virtually impossible without massive troop deployments.
• Manpower constraints: India deploys thousands of troops in Kashmir, but they must cover 125,000 km². Pilgrim tracks and villages in Anantnag district are spread out; often only small local police posts exist in remote hamlets. Quick reinforcement to an ambush site (like Baisaran) can take hours.
• Intelligence gaps: Despite heavy intelligence efforts, militants sometimes mobilize in deep countryside undetected. The attackers in Pahalgam appeared to know the exact camping spot of the pilgrims, indicating prior scouting that eluded local informants. Gathering human intelligence (informers) is hard when militants intimidate villagers or coerce support.
• Cross-border infiltration: Even as security focusses on ground routes, militants often slip in through the LoC using tunnels or forest trails from across the Line of Control. TRF being Pakistan-linked suggests it exploited these well-established smuggling routes. Multi-layered fencing and sensors have improved detection but not eliminated infiltration.
• Local involvement: Militants may recruit local youth with financial incentives or ideological appeal. This complicates root-level trust: some Kashmiris, especially in rural areas, may sympathize with militants’ stated goals, making community policing delicate.
• Response mechanisms: In reaction to this attack, security agencies announced enhancements: more drone patrols over alpine meadows, installation of CCTV cameras at Pahalgam entrance, increased checkpoints along trekking paths. Specialized “tourist police” units (trained in first-response) were deployed to popular spots.
• Technology use: Armed forces are considering using AWACS surveillance from aircraft to spot large militant movements, and sensors that detect muzzle flashes or gunshots in the dark forests. However, budget and technical limitations mean these cannot cover all areas yet.
• Legal tools: The government can ban organizations (TRF was quickly banned), arrest suspects under anti-terror laws (UAPA, PSA). These laws give broad search and detention powers. But some critics note that legal processes are slow, so physical security remains the primary tool.
• Coordination: The attack exposed a need for tighter inter-agency coordination. After Pahalgam, an all-agency operation was launched, but initial delays were reported as forces gathered intel. In general, joint centres (Army-CRPF-Police) aim to share intel, but bureaucratic red tape can slow information flow.

Policy Debates: Pros & Cons of Current Strategies

Pros

• Strong central authority: With the 2019 abrogation of Article 370, the Union government argues it has clearer jurisdiction to tackle terrorism. Direct central rule is said to enable uniform security policies (e.g., deploying national paramilitary units) without state-level ambiguity.
• Tough laws: India’s stringent counterterror laws (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, Prevention of Terrorism Act, now repealed PSA) allow detention of suspects and banning terror outfits swiftly. Many militants have been captured or killed under these frameworks, arguably weakening insurgent leadership.
• Security infrastructure: In recent years, India has modernized border fencing, improved surveillance tech, and expanded forces in J&K. Many analysts credit these steps with reducing large-scale infiltration. The fact that this attack, though tragic, involved only a handful of militants suggests some containment.
• Development focus: The government has launched development projects (roads, universities, industries) in Kashmir, aimed at giving youths alternatives to militancy. Proponents say improved economy can erode militants’ influence over time.
• Mass surrenders: In 2022-24, hundreds of former militants surrendered and reintegrated, reducing active insurgents. This is seen as a success of both amnesty policies and pressure operations.

Cons

• Alienation risk: Critics argue that heavy security and legal crackdowns breed resentment. For instance, mass detentions under security laws are seen by some Kashmiris as human rights abuses, which could fuel further radicalization.
• Communalization debate: Measures like increased Hindu pilgrim security are necessary, but some worry they send the message that the state only protects majorities. This can inadvertently deepen communal divisions, which is exactly what militants exploit.
• Civilian hardship: Frequent curfews, searches, and checkpoints disrupt normal life for Kashmiri civilians. This can create a sense of collective punishment, which erodes local goodwill toward security forces.
• Information control: The government often imposes internet blackouts and media curbs during unrest. While intended to stop rumors, these measures are criticized for stifling dissent and hiding failures (e.g., critics say initial missteps in response weren’t immediately reported).
• Policy contradictions: Some analysts point out that economic schemes have not matched security spending. If locals see more soldiers than jobs, frustration persists. Also, reunification of Kashmiri Pandits (1990 exodus) has received limited attention, a historical grievance still unresolved.
• International image: Repeated terror incidents (despite assurances of normalcy) can hurt India’s global image as a safe travel destination. In the long term, this complicates foreign investment and tourism, beyond the immediate losses cited.

Broader Context: Terrorism in India

• National pattern: The Pahalgam attack fits into a broader landscape of post-2000 Indian terrorism. It is compared to the 2008 Mumbai attacks (third-party urban terror by LeT, 166 killed) and 2019 Pulwama (Jaish suicide bombing, 40 CRPF killed). These events collectively highlight that militant groups target civilians to make political points.
• Comparison chart of major attacks:

• Insights from comparison: The table shows that while Pulwama was aimed at military, both Pahalgam and Mumbai targeted unarmed civilians. Pahalgam’s casualties, though lower in number, were highly symbolic (pilgrims in a holy setting). It also underlines that Pakistan-sponsored groups were implicated in all three.
• Regional impact: The attack renews debates over how J&K differs from other insurgencies in India (e.g., Maoist guerrillas in Chhattisgarh). Unlike Maoists who fight the state overtly, J&K militants often cloak actions in religion. This has broader social implications for India’s secular ethos.
• International security: Such attacks influence India’s foreign policy. For example, the Pahalgam massacre drew international condemnation (Bangladesh, Middle Eastern countries denounced it), reflecting its global resonance. India responded by raising the issue at the UN and other forums, similar to how Mumbai/Pulwama shaped its diplomatic push against cross-border terror.
• Lessons learned: On a national level, Pahalgam’s modus operandi (remote ambush, sectarian killing) has parallels in the Kaluchak (2002) and Kashmir Pandits (2003) incidents. Understanding these patterns helps security forces anticipate and fortify future pilgrim routes and vulnerable spots.

The Way Forward: Strategies and Solutions

• Enhanced intelligence network: Strengthen human intelligence (HUMINT) by building trust with villagers. Encourage surrendered militants to share information. Use community policing models (e.g., unofficial local committees) so that suspicious movements in remote areas are reported early.
• Technology deployment: Expand use of drones (UAVs) and thermal cameras for continuous aerial surveillance of pilgrim trails and high-altitude meadows. Install gunshot detection systems in known tourist camps. Use satellite imaging to track militant camps in border regions.
• Rapid response units: Create specialized Tourist Security Task Forces trained for mountain combat and emergency medical aid. Station quick-reaction teams (armed helicopters, paramilitary squads) at key transit points (e.g., Pahalgam helipad, main highways) for immediate deployment.
• Secured pilgrim corridors: For major pilgrimages (Amarnath, Shivratri yatra, etc.), design “Green Corridors” with layered protection – e.g., foot patrols, sniffer dogs, barricades at entry. Earlier planning (drones scouting routes daily during Yatra) can detect hidden militants.
• Socio-economic measures: Address long-term grievances by investing in Kashmir’s education, job training, and entrepreneurship. For example, set up skills centers in Anantnag to employ local youth. Ensure that development schemes reach rural areas to undercut militants’ recruitment base.
• Political engagement: Foster dialogue by involving moderate Kashmiri voices (scholars, community leaders) in decision-making. Even while rejecting separatism, offer forums where local concerns (land rights, governance, autonomy claims) are heard. This reduces the sense that violence is the only way to be heard.
• Counter-narrative campaigns: Use social media and local media to highlight Kashmir’s pluralism – for instance, stories of Muslims shielding Hindus in past attacks. Promote the bravery of local heroes and the unity shown after Pahalgam to undermine militants’ sectarian message.
• International pressure: Continue diplomatic efforts to blacklist terror groups (like TRF) globally and pressure Pakistan to clamp down on their funding. India’s suspension of treaties (e.g., Indus Water) shows leverage; keep using such tools to bring cross-border terror sponsorship to the negotiating table.
• Victim support: Streamline compensation and rehabilitation for victims’ families (jobs for widows, scholarships for children). Such tangible support builds public confidence in the state’s commitment. Publicize protection of victims (like ensuring safety for Kashmiri Pandit pilgrims elsewhere) to prevent panic among minorities.
• Institutional reform: Regularly review police-military coordination. Provide counter-terror training to local police and continue joint drills. Ensure transparent accountability (if intelligence failures occurred, address them publicly).
• Community resilience: Promote local security forces (Indian Reserve Battalions recruited from J&K) who know the terrain. Empower Civilian Vigilance Committees in villages (such schemes exist in Maoist areas) to deter militants. Celebrate community unity days to heal divisions.

In conclusion, the Pahalgam attack underscores the enduring challenge of terrorism in Kashmir and its profound impact on India’s social fabric and security. It highlights the urgency of combining firm counterterror efforts with initiatives that address underlying grievances. By strengthening intelligence and rapid response, while also focusing on development, dialogue and rule of law, India can aim to protect its citizens and promote long-term peace.

Practice Question

Critically analyze the 2025 Pahalgam attack in the context of Kashmir’s militancy, sectarian violence patterns, and India’s counterterror strategies, suggesting comprehensive solutions to prevent such incidents in future. (250 words)