4.5.4 Different Rounds of WTO Talks | World Trade Organization (WTO)

The evolution of global trade negotiations from the mid-20th century to the present has been marked by successive rounds of talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization (WTO). Each round addressed the pressing trade issues of its era – from cutting tariffs on manufactured goods in the early post-war years to tackling complex areas like services, agriculture, and intellectual property in recent decades. These negotiations progressively expanded the rules of international trade, brought more countries (including developing economies) into the fold, and often reflected a balancing act between the interests of industrialized nations and the development needs of poorer countries. In the context of international economics, understanding these different rounds of WTO talks is crucial for grasping how today’s trade system and rules were shaped over time. This article reviews the major GATT/WTO negotiation rounds – beginning with the foundational Geneva Round of 1947 – and outlines their key outcomes and significance, with particular attention to how various issues (goods, agriculture, services, intellectual property) and developing country perspectives (including India’s experience) have been addressed.

The Geneva and Annecy Rounds (1947 and 1949)

• Founding of GATT and initial tariff cuts (Geneva 1947): In the aftermath of World War II, 23 nations convened in Geneva to reduce trade barriers and revive global commerce. This first round created the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a multilateral framework:
  • The negotiations produced some 45,000 tariff concessions covering about US$10 billion in trade, roughly one-fifth of global import value at the time. These concessions principally lowered duties on industrial goods, laying an early foundation for trade liberalization.
  • Participating countries bound themselves to the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) principle, meaning any tariff reduction agreed between two countries was extended to all GATT members equally. This helped prevent discrimination and the return of 1930s-style protectionist preferences.
  • Agriculture was only partially covered. While tariffs on some farm products were cut, crucial exemptions were left in place (for example, the United States secured flexibility to maintain import quotas for certain agricultural commodities to protect its farm sector). This foreshadowed the persistent difficulty of liberalizing agriculture in future rounds.
  • India was a founding member of the GATT in 1947. As a newly independent developing economy, it participated in the Geneva Round but undertook relatively modest tariff commitments. Like many poorer countries, India prioritized the ability to use tariffs and import restrictions for development objectives and balance-of-payments support, which GATT provisions (such as Article XVIII) permitted in principle.
• Consolidation and new members (Annecy 1949): The second round of talks took place in Annecy, France, and was mainly focused on expanding membership and building on the initial tariff reductions:
  • A dozen additional countries joined the GATT during the Annecy negotiations. These new contracting parties exchanged some 5,000 further tariff concessions with existing members. The process helped integrate war-torn and newly independent economies into the multilateral trade system.
  • Tariff cuts in Annecy were incremental. Many concessions involved extending the Geneva Round’s lower tariffs to new members or slightly reducing duties on specific items. The overall impact was to modestly deepen the tariff reductions achieved in 1947, although no major new areas of trade were tackled.
  • For developing countries entering GATT, including several in Asia and the Middle East, the Annecy Round set a precedent that they could participate in negotiations but were not expected to reciprocate fully in tariff cutting if it conflicted with their development needs. This understanding, though informal at the time, paved the way for later principles of special and differential treatment.
  • By 1949, India and other developing members remained cautious in opening their markets, often relying on GATT’s allowances for infant industry protection and balance-of-payments safeguards. The early rounds confirmed that while the global rules would be common, their application could be flexible for economies at different levels of development.

The Torquay Round (1950–1951)

• Expanded participation and further tariff reductions: The third GATT round was held in Torquay, England, with around 34 countries participating. This round continued the effort to cut tariffs on industrial goods:
  • Approximately 8,700 tariff concessions were negotiated at Torquay. These cuts brought down average tariff levels by roughly a quarter compared to pre-GATT levels. By the early 1950s, the major traders (like the US and UK) had significantly reduced the prohibitive tariff rates of the 1930s, moving toward more moderate duties.
  • Many of the concessions involved bilateral bargains that were then multilateralized via the MFN principle. For example, if the UK agreed to lower the tariff on an industrial machine part for one supplier country, that new lower rate applied to all GATT members. This mechanism steadily diffused tariff reductions across the participating economies.
  • Some sectors remained sensitive. While manufacturing tariffs dropped, sectors such as agriculture and textiles saw little liberalization. Countries maintained import restrictions on farm goods (the US continued using quotas for dairy and sugar, European nations protected grains and meats under various arrangements). Similarly, textile imports from low-cost producers were beginning to cause concern in industrialized countries, setting the stage for future special arrangements outside GATT (eventually the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in 1974).
• Developing country perspective in the early 1950s: By this round, more developing nations (from Latin America, Asia, Africa) had joined GATT, but their role in negotiations was still limited:
  • Developing economies generally did not make large reciprocal tariff cuts at Torquay. They were often beneficiaries of concessions made by richer nations, while claiming exemptions for themselves based on economic constraints. For instance, countries like India, Pakistan, and Brazil cited the need to protect infant industries and manage scarce foreign exchange, making only minimal binding commitments to lower their own import duties.
  • GATT’s rules started to adapt to this reality. Article XVIII was refined to explicitly allow developing countries to modify or withdraw concessions to promote industrial development or address balance-of-payments difficulties. India was one of the countries that frequently invoked these provisions in the 1950s to maintain tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports, as it pursued an import-substitution industrialization strategy.
  • The limited engagement of developing nations in substantive tariff cutting at Torquay underscored a growing recognition: a one-size-fits-all approach to liberalization would be problematic. This set the groundwork for later rounds to incorporate more explicit development-focused clauses, acknowledging that poorer members could not be expected to liberalize at the same pace as advanced economies.

The Geneva Round (1956)

• A limited scope tariff negotiation: The fourth GATT round – often called the Geneva Round of 1956 – was a relatively small negotiation aimed at fine-tuning tariff agreements. Twenty-two countries took part, including major traders like the US, UK, and the newly formed European Economic Community (EEC) in its early stages:
  • This round resulted in tariff concessions valued at about $2.5 billion in trade. While modest in comparison to earlier rounds, these cuts helped correct imbalances from previous negotiations. For example, if a country felt it had given more concessions than it received in 1947–51, it sought additional access in 1956 to even the score.
  • The focus remained on industrial products. By 1956, the average tariff on manufactured goods in the US, for instance, had been whittled down further (from pre-GATT highs often above 30% to around low teens). The Geneva Round nudged some of these rates a bit lower. In Europe, this negotiation coincided with the formation of the EEC’s Common External Tariff, which would soon harmonize tariffs among six European countries. The round thus helped ensure the EEC’s initial external tariffs were set at levels consistent with GATT commitments.
  • Agriculture saw virtually no new concessions. The US was preparing to implement domestic price supports and the Europeans were establishing the Common Agricultural Policy – both indicating that agriculture trade liberalization was politically off the table. The 1956 talks therefore bypassed contentious farm trade issues and stuck to easier wins in industrial tariffs.
• Transition and preparation for new challenges: The mid-1950s marked a transition in the trade landscape and foreshadowed topics for future rounds:
  • The entry of new economic groupings changed negotiation dynamics. The EEC (created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome) meant that going forward, a bloc of European nations would negotiate tariffs as one unit. This consolidation of bargaining power on the European side was a preview of more complex talks ahead, requiring bigger concessions among fewer power centers (notably US vs EEC).
  • Japan’s participation in GATT became effective in 1955, and by 1956 Japan was an active negotiating party. This was significant as Japan’s rapidly growing industrial exports were beginning to make it a major trade player. The Geneva Round allowed other countries to negotiate tariff arrangements with Japan, though some nations maintained “transitional” restrictions on Japanese imports out of concern for domestic industries.
  • For developing countries, the 1956 round again underscored that they were largely “rule takers” rather than “rule makers” at this stage. Countries like India kept a defensive stance, utilizing GATT’s development exceptions to shield their economies. The seeds of dissatisfaction were growing, however, leading developing members to start voicing the need for the trading system to pay greater attention to their development priorities – a theme that would become prominent in the 1960s (notably with the birth of UNCTAD in 1964 and demands for “trade, not aid”).

The Dillon Round (1960–1961)

• Adjusting to the European Common Market: The Dillon Round (named after U.S. Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon) was the fifth GATT negotiation round, involving 26 countries. It took place just after the European Economic Community (Common Market) came into being, and one major task was to integrate this new reality into GATT commitments:
  • With the six EEC countries (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) forming a customs union, they adopted a Common External Tariff. The Dillon Round had to reconcile these unified European tariffs with GATT rules. This meant the EEC offered tariff reductions to compensate other countries for any increases that occurred when member states aligned their tariffs upward to the common level.
  • Tariff negotiations in Dillon therefore had a dual nature: one part was a set of bilateral talks between the EEC and various trading partners to adjust to the Common External Tariff; the other part was a general round of tariff cuts on industrial goods among all participants. The overall result was relatively modest in scope – estimates suggest around $4.9 billion worth of trade concessions resulted from the round.
  • Industrial tariffs edged down slightly further. For instance, the United States and EEC exchanged some reductions on each other’s goods, but nothing as dramatic as the across-the-board cuts of earlier rounds. The shadow of upcoming broader negotiations (the Kennedy Round was already being anticipated) meant Dillon was seen as a preparatory step.
• Emergence of development themes: The early 1960s saw developing countries organizing to assert their interests in the global trade system, and some of this momentum influenced the Dillon Round indirectly:
  • Many developing countries felt they gained little from the first decade of GATT rounds. Primary commodity prices were volatile and often declining, while their exports faced tariff escalation (higher duties on processed goods than raw materials) in rich markets. Meanwhile, developing nations were still expected to lower their own tariffs over time, which they feared could undermine nascent industries.
  • During the Dillon Round, these concerns led to initial proposals for special measures to help poorer countries. Although the round itself focused on tariff negotiations largely among developed players, the seeds were planted for GATT to formally recognize development differences. This culminated soon after in the addition of Part IV to the GATT (in 1965), titled “Trade and Development,” which stated that developed countries should not expect reciprocal concessions from developing countries in trade negotiations and should give high priority to the trade interests of less-developed members.
  • India was at the forefront of articulating the development perspective. Along with countries like Brazil and Egypt, India argued within GATT forums and at the United Nations that the trading system needed to accommodate countries at different stages. The formation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, led by developing nations, was a parallel effort that increased pressure on GATT to address issues like commodity trade, preferences, and aid for trade. The Dillon Round’s limited ambition on development issues helped convince developing countries to push for a bigger voice and dedicated forum for their concerns, setting the stage for more attention to these issues in the next round.

The Kennedy Round (1964–1967)

• Comprehensive tariff cutting and a new approach: The Kennedy Round was a landmark sixth round of GATT talks, named in honor of the late U.S. President John F. Kennedy (who had obtained domestic authority for these negotiations through the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962). Conducted in Geneva with 62 participating countries (including the United States, the European Community, the UK, Japan, and many developing nations), this round achieved unprecedented tariff reductions:
  • Instead of item-by-item haggling, negotiators adopted a general formula approach for the first time. The agreed formula was roughly a 50% cut in tariffs on industrial goods, across the board, with exceptions for certain sensitive items. In practice, the average tariff reduction achieved was about 35% due to those exceptions. This slashed duties on thousands of products, significantly lowering costs for trade in manufactured goods. For example, U.S. average industrial tariffs fell into single digits as a result of the Kennedy Round concessions.
  • An important outcome was the first anti-dumping agreement under GATT. Dumping (exporting products at prices below normal value to gain market share) was a contentious issue, and the new code established basic rules and procedures for anti-dumping actions. This was a response to concerns from industries in the U.S. and Europe about unfair pricing, and it sought to bring more consistency to national anti-dumping laws.
  • Tariff cuts extended to more participants and sectors than ever before, although agriculture remained problematic. Some limited agreements on grains were reached (the International Grains Arrangement, comprising food aid and minimal tariff concessions on cereals), but core agricultural protections in the EEC and U.S. were left largely intact. The focus was overwhelmingly on industrial trade.
• Advances for developing countries in principle: The Kennedy Round coincided with a growing assertiveness of developing countries in GATT and other fora:
  • In 1965, during the round, GATT members added Part IV (“Trade and Development”) to the agreement. This was a milestone in formally acknowledging that developing countries warrant special treatment. Part IV’s provisions, though not binding obligations, urged developed members to improve market access for developing countries’ exports and not demand strict reciprocity in negotiations. This was a direct response to the drumbeat from countries like India, Brazil, and others that the existing system was imbalanced.
  • The idea of preferential trade for developing countries gained traction. While the Kennedy Round itself did not implement generalized preferences, it laid the groundwork for the establishment of schemes like the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) shortly thereafter. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, many developed countries unilaterally granted tariff-free or reduced-tariff entry to certain goods from developing countries. India and other developing nations had advocated such measures to spur their industrial exports (for example, preferential lower tariffs on Indian textile or leather goods into European markets to aid industrialization).
  • Despite these developments, developing countries were disappointed that the round’s outcomes still largely favored trade among the industrial giants. The major tariff cuts mainly benefited trade flows between Western Europe, North America, and Japan (the “Triad” economies of the time). While those cuts also applied to developing country exports under MFN, many poorer nations exported a narrow range of primary commodities or simple manufactures that often faced non-tariff barriers or were excluded (e.g., agriculture, textiles were not significantly liberalized). As a result, countries like India saw only modest direct gains: for instance, India’s export basket in the 1960s (tea, jute, textiles) didn’t fully benefit from the industrial tariff focus and continued to face quotas or price volatility.
  • On the domestic front, India maintained a strategy of protecting its own nascent industries during the 1960s. Even as developed countries were slashing tariffs mutually, India availed itself of Part IV’s spirit by not matching those cuts. This asymmetry was accepted under GATT norms – India was not required to reciprocate the deep tariff reductions undertaken by Western countries in the Kennedy Round. This allowed India to continue with high import tariffs and quantitative restrictions to foster domestic industrial growth, while still enjoying MFN access for its exports in the markets of GATT partners.

The Tokyo Round (1973–1979)

• Broadening the scope beyond tariffs: The seventh round, known as the Tokyo Round, took place in the 1970s when the global economy faced new challenges (oil shocks, inflation, a breakdown of the Bretton Woods currency system). A total of 102 countries participated, reflecting the wide membership of GATT by then, including a large number of developing countries. This round achieved further tariff cuts and, notably, addressed non-tariff barriers in a systematic way:
  • Tariffs on industrial goods were cut by an average of about one-third among developed countries. This brought these tariffs to historically low levels (for example, post-Tokyo Round, major industrialized countries’ average MFN tariffs on manufactured imports were often in the range of 4–8%). A “tariff formula” approach (the Swiss formula) was used to harmonize tariffs, which cut higher tariffs more steeply – so if a country had some very high duties, those were reduced proportionally more. This helped tackle tariff peaks that particularly affected exports of interest to developing countries (like high tariffs on textiles, clothing, or shoes in developed markets, though again those sectors also had quotas or other limits).
  • Codes on non-tariff measures: Recognizing that many obstacles to trade were now in the form of regulations, subsidies, or administrative practices rather than tariffs, the Tokyo Round produced a set of plurilateral agreements (often called “codes”) to discipline various non-tariff barriers:
    • A Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code set clearer rules on what subsidies are permissible and how countries can respond to unfair subsidy practices (through countervailing duties). It distinguished between prohibited export subsidies and other subsidies, at least for industrial goods (agricultural subsidies were still largely exempt at this stage for developed countries).
    • A Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Code (Standards Code) aimed to ensure that product standards, testing, and certification requirements are not used as disguised protectionism. It encouraged transparency and non-discrimination in the development of technical regulations.
    • A revised Anti-Dumping Code updated disciplines on dumping beyond what was done in the Kennedy Round, refining the procedures to determine dumping margins and injury to domestic industries.
    • Codes on Customs Valuation (to standardize how customs authorities determine the value of imports for tariff purposes), Import Licensing procedures (to ensure they are simple and neutral), and Government Procurement (opening procurement markets in a limited way among signatories) were also agreed. The Government Procurement Code was particularly notable as it was one of the first efforts to bring government purchasing under trade rules, albeit as a plurilateral commitment (only those who signed were bound, and developing countries generally did not sign this code, preserving their ability to favor domestic suppliers in public procurement).
  • Importantly, these codes were not signed by all GATT members – they were voluntary agreements among those who chose to adhere. Many developing countries felt they lacked the capacity or readiness to implement these detailed disciplines, so they stayed out of certain codes. As a result, the Tokyo Round created a two-tier system: signatories of codes (mostly developed nations and a few advanced developing ones) and non-signatories (many poorer countries) who were not bound by those specific rules.
• Special and differential treatment gains: The Tokyo Round occurred in an era when developing countries had a strong collective voice (the 1970s saw the assertion of the “New International Economic Order” and activism through UNCTAD). Some outcomes of the round reflected developing country demands:
  • The “Enabling Clause” of 1979 was a landmark decision that emerged from the Tokyo negotiations. It made permanent legal provision for preferential treatment of developing countries. This enabled schemes like the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which developed countries grant non-reciprocal tariff concessions to developing countries, to continue without violating GATT’s MFN rule. It also allowed developing countries more freedom to form regional trade agreements among themselves and for developed countries to provide special treatment to least-developed countries. In essence, the Enabling Clause formally exempted developing-oriented preferences from challenge, recognizing that strict equal treatment sometimes needed to be set aside to assist poorer nations.
  • Throughout the Tokyo Round, developing countries, including India, had pressed to be subjected to fewer obligations in the new codes. Consequently, many developing countries agreed to the principle that they could accept or reject each code. India, for example, chose to sign some Tokyo Round codes (like those on anti-dumping and subsidies) but did not initially sign the Government Procurement code, preserving its policy space in that area. Moreover, where developing countries did sign on, they often negotiated special provisions or transition periods. For instance, the subsidies code had leniencies allowing developing countries to use certain subsidies for development purposes.
  • Trade in agriculture still remained unresolved in any meaningful way during the Tokyo Round. Developed members had postponed tackling the fundamental reforms to farm trade, although this neglect was increasingly untenable as surplus production and costly subsidy programs (e.g., the European Economic Community’s butter mountains and wine lakes resulting from price supports) were becoming glaring issues. Developing countries, many of whom were importers of food as well as aspiring exporters in some commodities, kept the pressure on that agriculture would need to be dealt with in the future. India, for its part, maintained high import barriers on agricultural products to protect its farmers and strive for self-sufficiency, while also interested in opportunities to export certain crops like tea, coffee, or spices. The Tokyo Round’s inability to discipline agricultural protection would soon lead to the inclusion of agriculture as a central topic in the next round.
  • By the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the GATT had dramatically expanded its reach via these new codes, but the “code approach” also highlighted a systemic weakness: the presence of differing obligations for different members was complex and fragmenting. This outcome set the stage for the idea of a single, unified undertaking in the subsequent Uruguay Round, where all members would accept all agreements, to avoid the fragmentation that had arisen with the optional codes.

The Uruguay Round (1986–1994)

• Launch and broad agenda: The eighth and most ambitious round, the Uruguay Round, was launched at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1986. It eventually lasted over seven years, involving 123 participating countries – by then essentially the entire world trading community. This round was defined by its expansive scope, tackling not only traditional market access (tariffs, quotas) but also entirely new areas of trade policy, against the backdrop of a rapidly globalizing economy:
  • Key factors driving this broad agenda included frustration with the gap between the rules and reality in areas like agriculture and textiles (where rich countries had major protections), the rise of the service economy and cross-border services trade (finance, telecommunications, transport, professional services) that were not covered by GATT, and concerns by advanced economies (notably the US) about insufficient protection of intellectual property rights and investment barriers abroad. Additionally, the Tokyo Round’s selective codes approach was seen as inadequate; many wanted a stronger, more integrated trade system with better dispute resolution.
  • The agenda was divided broadly into 15 groups of negotiations. It included traditional topics like tariffs on industrial goods and agricultural market access, but also wholly new subjects such as services trade, intellectual property, and trade-related investment measures. This comprehensive approach was termed the “single undertaking” – essentially, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and all participants sign onto the full package of agreements at the end. This mechanism ensured that concessions in one area could be traded off against gains in another, enabling a grand bargain.
• Major outcomes in goods (tariffs, agriculture, textiles): The Uruguay Round concluded in 1994 with the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) effective from 1995. Key achievements in goods trade were far-reaching:
  • Industrial tariffs were slashed further. Developed countries agreed to reduce their tariffs on manufactured goods by an average of about 40%, bringing average MFN industrial tariffs in major economies down to roughly 3% by the late 1990s. Many sectors saw elimination or near-elimination of duties (for example, tariffs on pharmaceuticals, construction equipment, paper, and steel were significantly lowered across many markets). Developing countries also reduced tariffs, though generally by smaller magnitudes and with exceptions for sensitive industries, adopting what was called “less than full reciprocity” in tariff cuts.
  • Agriculture – for the first time, farming trade was brought under comprehensive multilateral rules through the new Agreement on Agriculture. This required:
    • Tariffication and market access: Countries converted non-tariff barriers (like import bans or quotas) into tariffs and then committed to reduce those tariffs over time (developed countries cut agricultural tariffs by an average 36% over six years, developing countries by 24% over ten years). They also established tariff-rate quotas to ensure minimum access for previously restricted goods, allowing a certain quantity to enter at lower tariffs.
    • Domestic support disciplines: Farm subsidies that distort trade were categorized (the “amber box” of most distortive subsidies was capped and slated for reduction by 20% in developed countries; “blue box” subsidies tied to production-limiting programs and “green box” non-trade-distorting support, like research or environmental payments, were permitted). Although initial reduction commitments were modest relative to the very high subsidy levels, this was a critical first step in subjecting agricultural policies to trade rules.
    • Export subsidies: Developed countries agreed to cut the value of export subsidies by 36% and the quantity of subsidized exports by 21% over six years (developing countries had lesser obligations). This began a process to rein in the practice of dumping surplus produce with the help of government subsidies – a practice that had hurt farmers in unsubsidized countries.
    • These agriculture provisions marked a dramatic shift: for example, the European Communities had to bind and reduce its massive export refunds on dairy, sugar, and cereals, and countries like Japan had to tariffy their blanket bans on rice imports (creating a quota for minimum rice imports each year). For countries like India, which maintained high import barriers and some domestic support for staple crops, the Agreement on Agriculture formalized those policies within new limits but also promised the potential of fairer competition abroad if rich country subsidies were disciplined over time.
  • Textiles and Clothing – another historic aspect was the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which set a timetable to phase out the Multi-Fibre Arrangement quotas by 2005. For decades, developed countries had circumvented GATT rules by imposing bilateral quotas on textile and garment imports from developing countries (like India, China, Pakistan, etc.) to protect their own industries. Under the Uruguay Round deal, these quotas would be eliminated in four stages over 10 years, integrating the textile trade fully into normal WTO rules. This was a major gain for competitive garment exporters in Asia and elsewhere, promising significantly greater access to U.S. and European markets once quotas ended (and indeed, by the mid-2000s countries like Bangladesh, China, and India saw a surge in textile and clothing exports as quota limits were removed).
  • The round also updated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade itself (dubbed “GATT 1994” in the WTO context) and incorporated stronger rules on customs valuation, import licensing, safeguards (a new Agreement on Safeguards standardized the use of emergency import measures), and agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) to ensure health and safety regulations for food and animals are science-based and not arbitrarily protectionist.
• Major outcomes in new areas (services, IP, investment, dispute settlement): The Uruguay Round didn’t just stop at goods. It fundamentally expanded the rulebook:
  • General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): This was the first multilateral framework for governing international trade in services. GATS established principles of transparency and gradual liberalization in service sectors, while allowing each member to choose which sectors to open and to what extent, by making specific commitments in a schedule. It covered modes of supplying services including Mode 3 (commercial presence, like foreign direct investment in banking or telecom) and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons, like professionals and workers moving temporarily for service provision). For example, under GATS, India committed to some openness in sectors like software services and also sought opportunities for its skilled workers to work abroad (Mode 4 commitments from other countries were modest, but this became a negotiating priority for India). Over time, GATS created a basis for countries to negotiate greater market access in areas like finance, telecom, transport, and tourism, with progressive rounds envisioned.
  • Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): Perhaps the most controversial new agreement, TRIPS set minimum standards of protection for a wide range of intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, trade secrets, etc.). It required all WTO members to adopt and enforce these standards within set transition periods. For instance, patent protection must last 20 years and be available for virtually all fields of technology; this was a significant change for countries like India, which until then had allowed only process (not product) patents for pharmaceuticals and had shorter patent terms. TRIPS also addressed topics like geographical indications (special status for region-specific product names such as Champagne or Darjeeling tea), and outlined rules for enforcement and dispute settlement in IP. Developing countries were given extra time to implement TRIPS obligations (generally until 2000, and least-developed countries even longer, with extensions). India had to amend its patents law by 2005 to comply, which it did, transforming its pharmaceutical patent regime while trying to preserve mechanisms (like compulsory licensing) to ensure affordable medicines.
  • Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs): This agreement targeted certain investment practices that were seen as distorting trade, such as requirements on foreign investors to use local inputs or to balance imports with exports. It prohibited trade-related investment measures that violated the GATT’s basic principles (for example, a rule that a foreign car maker must source 50% of parts locally would be inconsistent with the prohibition on quantitative restrictions). Countries with such measures (and many developing countries had them to promote local industry) had to eliminate them within a transition period. India, for example, had used local content rules in industries like electronics and autos, and under TRIMs it had to remove those requirements by early 2000s.
  • Improved Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Uruguay Round created the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes – effectively, the WTO’s new dispute settlement system. This overhauled the old GATT system by introducing strict timelines for case resolution, automatic establishment of panels (no more unilateral veto by the accused party), and, most significantly, an Appellate Body to hear appeals on points of law. The rulings of panels and the Appellate Body would be binding unless all WTO members (including the winning party) agreed by consensus to block them – a virtually impossible scenario – thereby ensuring enforcement. This was a huge change that made the WTO’s dispute mechanism one of the most effective in international law. Countries like India have actively used this system both to challenge others (India has brought cases on issues like agricultural subsidies, steel tariffs, and U.S. visa fees) and to defend its measures when challenged (such as cases on India’s patents law and export incentives).
  • Institutional reform: The creation of the WTO means trade negotiations, dispute settlement, and periodic policy review are now housed under one permanent organization. The WTO framework also bundled all agreements together – nations acceding to the WTO must accept the whole package (“single undertaking”), unlike the a-la-carte approach of GATT codes. This brought uniformity: for instance, even smaller and developing countries now are subject to the TRIPS agreement and all other accords, though with some flexibility in implementation.
• Implications for developing countries and India: The Uruguay Round was a grand bargain with mixed feelings in the developing world:
  • Developing countries did achieve some important gains. They got the promise of better access in textiles (end of quotas) and agriculture (though actual liberalization by developed countries was limited, at least rules were in place to curb worst abuses and further reform was envisaged). Many developing Asian and Latin American nations also benefited from the overall tariff cuts as their manufacturing exports like electronics, auto parts, and consumer goods faced lower import taxes in rich markets.
  • However, they also had to take on many more obligations than before. For nations like India, this meant enacting new laws on intellectual property (patents, copyrights etc.), adjusting investment and industrial policies to remove certain protections, and facing potential challenges if domestic regulations violated any WTO agreement. There was concern that these obligations constrained policy space for development. For example, enforcing pharmaceutical patents raised fears about drug prices (which India and others mitigated somewhat by later negotiations for public health flexibility). Similarly, opening service sectors or government procurement to foreign competition created internal debates about impact on domestic firms and jobs.
  • India’s experience epitomized this trade-off. On one hand, India’s competitive industries like software services, textiles, and generic pharmaceuticals stood to gain from more open global markets and clearer rules. Indian commerce grew rapidly post-1995, aided by the more stable and predictable trading environment WTO membership provided. On the other hand, India negotiated hard to safeguard its interests: it fought to retain rights to protect farmers and food security (e.g., ensuring that domestic support categories in agriculture left room for its minimum support prices for crops), and it joined forces with other developing nations to secure special transition periods and exceptions (such as a ten-year phase-out for clothing quotas, and extended time to implement TRIPS). The Uruguay Round thus marked India’s full integration into the global trading system, as a founding member of the WTO, while also testing its ability to leverage coalitions and negotiations to reflect its development priorities.
  • The Uruguay Round’s results were far-reaching. By the round’s end in 1994, the trade regime had transformed: goods, services, and intellectual property were now all under one umbrella, and the number of countries subject to these rules had expanded (with China, Russia, and others joining the WTO in subsequent years). This evolution set the stage for the next challenges – implementing the agreements faithfully and addressing the gaps and imbalances that remained, many of which would shape the agenda of the next round of talks launched in Doha.

The Doha Development Round (2001–Present)

• Launch of the Doha Round with a focus on development: The ninth round of multilateral trade negotiations, known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), was inaugurated at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. Coming on the heels of the 1999 Seattle Ministerial failure and set against the backdrop of a global downturn and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, there was strong political will to reassert confidence in the multilateral trading system. WTO members – by then numbering over 140 – agreed to an expansive negotiating agenda with development at its core:
  • The mandate explicitly recognized the need to place developing countries’ needs and interests at the heart of the work program. This was in part a response to critiques that the Uruguay Round outcomes had not sufficiently addressed problems faced by poorer members (for example, high subsidies in rich countries hurting agriculture in developing countries, or implementation difficulties with new WTO rules).
  • Key areas for negotiation included: further agricultural reform (market access, domestic support, export subsidies), services trade liberalization (building on the GATS framework), industrial tariffs (often termed Non-Agricultural Market Access, or NAMA), strengthening special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries, and addressing issues of interest to least-developed countries (like duty-free quota-free access to markets). Newer themes like trade and environment and certain “Singapore issues” (so named from the 1996 Singapore Ministerial – investment, competition policy, government procurement transparency, and trade facilitation) were also on the table, though their fate in the round varied.
  • One early achievement tied to Doha was the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health in 2001. This important declaration clarified that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. It affirmed countries’ rights to use compulsory licensing and parallel imports as allowed by TRIPS to ensure access to essential medicines (crucial for countries dealing with health crises like HIV/AIDS). It also led to a 2003 decision (later an amendment to TRIPS) making it easier for countries with no pharmaceutical production to import generic medicines produced under compulsory license elsewhere. India was a key advocate for this outcome, given its large generic drug industry and public health needs domestically and in other developing nations.
• Agriculture at the heart of Doha negotiations: Agriculture was arguably the centerpiece of the Doha Round because it was both economically significant for many developing members and symbolically important to demonstrate development focus:
  • The aim was to substantially reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies in developed countries (e.g., the US’s farm bill supports and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy payments) which developing countries argued created unfair competition and depressed world prices. Developing countries also sought elimination of remaining agricultural export subsidies (picking up from where the Uruguay Round left off) and disciplines on export credits and food aid that could circumvent subsidy limits.
  • On market access, Doha negotiations targeted steep cuts in high agricultural tariffs (some exceeding 100% in markets like Europe and Japan for sensitive items like dairy or sugar), while allowing flexibility for developing countries to shield certain “special products” critical for food security and rural livelihoods. Also on the table was a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) that would let developing countries temporarily raise tariffs if faced with import surges or price drops that threaten their farmers.
  • A coalition of developing countries called the G20 (formed at the 2003 Cancún Ministerial and led by Brazil, India, China, South Africa, among others) played a pivotal role in agriculture talks. They presented a united front demanding deeper subsidy cuts from the US/EU and more modest market opening commitments for themselves, reflecting their large populations of farmers. India, for example, insisted that millions of marginal farmers could be harmed by sudden import competition, and thus robust safeguards and ability to designate special products were non-negotiable.
  • Despite various proposals and some convergence (such as broad agreement to eliminate export subsidies by a set date and to use a tiered formula for cutting subsidies and tariffs), differences proved hard to bridge. The US and EU argued that advanced developing countries should also make significant market access concessions and not shield too many products, whereas countries like India and Indonesia countered that rural poverty and livelihood risk justified greater flexibility. This divide repeatedly stymied consensus.
• Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and services: Parallel to agriculture, negotiations on reducing tariffs (and some non-tariff barriers) for industrial goods and expanding services trade continued:
  • NAMA talks sought to cut manufacturing tariffs especially where they remained high in both developed sectors with peaks (such as textiles, footwear, fish products) and in emerging economies with higher average tariffs. A Swiss formula (a type of non-linear formula that disproportionately cuts higher tariffs) was proposed to bring down tariff ceilings. Developed countries pushed for ambitious coefficients that would slash emerging economies’ tariffs substantially, while emerging economies, including India, argued for less drastic cuts given the need to protect sensitive industrial sectors and allow “policy space” for industrialization. They also insisted on flexibilities, like the option to exempt a small percentage of tariff lines from formula cuts or to have smaller reductions on some products.
  • India and other developing nations were especially wary of tariff reductions in sectors where they faced import competition or had nascent industries (for instance, India had concerns about opening its auto, chemicals, or electronics sectors too quickly). They sought a balance where they could gain from others’ tariff cuts (expanding export opportunities for their textiles, engineering goods, etc.) while managing their own liberalization pace.
  • Services negotiations were pursued through a request-offer process under the GATS. Sectors like financial services, telecommunications, transportation, IT, and professional services saw interest from various members. The EU and US, for example, sought greater access for their banks, telecom companies, and express delivery firms in emerging markets. India, on the other hand, was very keen on liberalization of Mode 4 (movement of natural persons), seeking easier entry for Indian professionals and service providers (IT specialists, engineers, doctors, etc.) into developed country markets on temporary visas. Some progress was made in getting offers – a number of countries signaled willingness to open more sectors or relax certain restrictions – but generally offers remained conservative. Many developing countries were reluctant to significantly open areas like retail, legal services, or domestic transport, which they saw as sensitive or where regulatory frameworks were weak.
  • By the late 2000s, draft modalities in both NAMA and services existed but were linked to progress in agriculture – a common dynamic in Doha was that nothing would be finally agreed in one pillar until everything was agreed across all pillars, repeating the single undertaking principle. This meant a holdup in agriculture also delayed closure in industrial goods and services, even if those were technically ripe for conclusion.
• Stalling and attempts at revival: The Doha Round missed its original deadline of 2005 for completion and then went through cycles of impasse and tentative reactivation:
  • The Cancún Ministerial in 2003 collapsed dramatically. A major factor was disagreement over agriculture (the EU-US offered a proposal seen as insufficient on subsidy cuts; the G20 countered with stronger demands; an additional group of poorer developing countries, the G33, led by India and others, emphasized safeguards and special products). Moreover, African and Asian countries objected to launching negotiations on the Singapore issues (investment, competition, etc.) when core issues like agriculture were unresolved. Eventually, three of those four new issues were dropped from the agenda in order to salvage the round – only trade facilitation survived (as it had more universal appeal).
  • A framework agreement in July 2004 got talks back on track, outlining general approaches for cutting subsidies and tariffs (e.g., richer countries to make deeper cuts, flexibility for developing countries to shield some items) and confirming the elimination of agricultural export subsidies by an end date. This paved the way for progress at the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005.
  • In Hong Kong (Dec 2005), ministers agreed on some development-oriented early harvests: for example, developed countries (and advanced developing countries in a position to do so) would provide duty-free and quota-free market access for at least 97% of products from least-developed countries. They also set 2013 as the end date for eliminating agricultural export subsidies (a target eventually realized in Nairobi 2015). On cotton, there was a commitment to address cotton subsidies “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically” due to pressure from West African countries – developed countries agreed to eliminate export subsidies on cotton in 2006 and provide duty-free, quota-free access for cotton exports from least-developed countries. However, on the core issues of domestic support and market access formulas, Hong Kong left the specifics to be finalized later.
  • The critical push to conclude the round came in mid-2008. Extensive talks in Geneva among a small group of key players (US, EU, India, Brazil, China, Australia, Japan and others – the so-called G7 or G8 in WTO context) attempted to finalize terms. There was convergence on many points: e.g., approximate numbers for subsidy caps (the US offered to limit its overall trade-distorting farm subsidies to around $14 billion, down from allowed ~$48 billion; the EU agreed to cuts bringing its cap to around €22 billion) and on the tariff cutting formulas for agriculture and NAMA. But a specific dispute over the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) derailed the talks – India and China insisted that if imports of a farm product surged by more than 10% volume, they should be allowed to impose an extra safeguard tariff exceeding pre-Doha bound levels to protect farmers, whereas the US opposed such a lenient trigger and high ceiling, fearing it would shut their exports out just when they gained market access. Neither side budged, and the July 2008 mini-ministerial collapsed largely on that issue.
  • After 2008, the momentum was lost. The global financial crisis in 2008-09 shifted focus away from trade talks. Although negotiations never officially ended, they drifted. There were periodic attempts to revive or “harvest” parts of Doha: talks on environmental goods, or a scaled-back package on tariff and subsidy quotas, but consensus was elusive. The required unanimity of 160+ members on a big package proved unreachable in practice.
• Partial outcomes and continuing issues: Recognizing the deadlock, WTO members pivoted to pursuing smaller agreements and new approaches:
  • Trade facilitation was salvaged from Doha and negotiated to conclusion in 2013 as a stand-alone agreement (see Bali section). This showed that segments of Doha could be picked off and finalized if politically feasible.
  • Other areas like services saw alternate paths: for example, some members went ahead with a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiation outside the WTO (though it’s not concluded), and a subset clinched an Information Technology Agreement (ITA) expansion in 2015 to cut tariffs on high-tech products – the ITA had originally been a 1996 plurilateral deal.
  • Doha’s unresolved core issues – especially how to further liberalize agriculture and industrial trade in a balanced way, and how to strengthen rules on subsidies or fishery subsidies – remained on the agenda in name. Developing countries continued to raise concerns in the WTO about imbalances (like the huge domestic farm supports of rich economies that were still allowed even if under reduced caps, or the need for easier safeguards for them). India consistently emphasized that without addressing these fundamental issues, moving to negotiations on new issues would be unfair.
  • By the mid-2010s, major economies started openly saying that the Doha Round was effectively over even if not formally closed. The Nairobi Ministerial Declaration in 2015 reflected this impasse by noting disagreement on the continuation of the Doha mandate (some members wished to continue Doha talks, others wanted to consider new issues in new formats). Essentially, the Doha Round did not conclude with a comprehensive agreement as envisioned, but it did indirectly lead to some important standalone deals (trade facilitation, export subsidies ban, etc.) and set the stage for a more fragmented approach to trade negotiations going forward.
• India’s leadership role: Throughout the Doha Round, India emerged as a key spokesperson for developing countries’ interests:
  • In alliance with countries like Brazil, South Africa, China, and various developing blocs (G20 for agriculture, G33 for import protection, NAMA-11 for industrial tariff flexibility, etc.), India pushed hard for reductions in developed-country farm subsidies and for meaningful market access in agriculture, while defending its right to maintain higher tariffs on farm goods and special safeguards. India’s stance was informed by the fact that over half of its population depends on agriculture for livelihood, making it politically and economically critical to shield farmers from potential import surges of subsidized foreign produce.
  • On industrial goods, India advocated for less-than-full reciprocity – meaning developed countries, which had higher historical protection in some sectors, should cut more, whereas developing countries like India should have gentler obligations. India’s tariff profile by 2001 included some high bindings (ceiling rates) but relatively lower applied rates in many sectors due to 1990s reforms; however, it still wanted to preserve the ability to raise tariffs within bound limits if industries came under threat. In negotiations, India sought flexibility to exclude a percentage of tariff lines from formula cuts or to apply smaller cuts to some sensitive sectors, aligning with other emerging economies on this ask.
  • In services, India’s offensive interest (Mode 4) made it an active demandeur in that area. It submitted specific proposals for easier visa regimes and recognition of qualifications to allow movement of service professionals. This met resistance from developed countries worried about immigration and job impacts. Conversely, India was cautious in making new binding offers in areas like retail, banking or insurance, where domestic stakeholders were concerned about foreign competition. India’s dual role as both a defensive and offensive player in services epitomized the complexity of being a large emerging economy with diverse interests.
  • Throughout the talks, India underscored the centrality of development – arguing that issues like cotton (key for African farmers), special products (for food security), and implementation delays for poorer countries were not side matters but integral to a balanced outcome. India’s ministers often took leadership in articulating common positions for developing countries, for instance, at critical meetings India helped forge joint statements of the G33 or LDC groups when their concerns needed highlighting.
  • The lack of a final Doha agreement was frustrating to India, as some of its key asks (like substantial cuts in U.S. cotton and farm subsidies, or a permanent solution on public food stockholding programs) were left hanging. Nevertheless, India’s active participation and coalition-building during the Doha era cemented its reputation as an influential WTO player, capable of shaping the agenda and outcomes, a role it continues to play in subsequent ministerial conferences.

The Bali Package (2013)

• Context and significance of the Bali deal: By 2013, the broader Doha Round was still unresolved, but WTO members sought achievable components that could be harvested. The Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia resulted in a milestone agreement known as the Bali Package. It was significant as the first multilateral trade agreement concluded since the establishment of the WTO, demonstrating that consensus was still possible on trade liberalization measures:
  • The package was explicitly framed as an “early harvest” of the Doha Round, focusing on areas where agreement was within reach. Its success helped restore some credibility to the WTO’s negotiating function after years of impasse.
  • The Bali Ministerial drew high attention in countries like India because of a crucial issue on the table: public stockholding for food security purposes. In the lead-up, India had taken a firm stand that it would not sign off on the Trade Facilitation Agreement (the key component of Bali) unless its food security concerns were addressed. This linkage put pressure on developed members to find a compromise, underscoring how a single country’s vital interests could influence the fate of a global deal.
• Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA): The centerpiece of the Bali Package was the Trade Facilitation Agreement, aimed at cutting red tape and streamlining customs procedures worldwide:
  • Key provisions: The TFA obliges members to expedite the movement, release, and clearance of goods. Measures include:
    • Transparency requirements (publish customs procedures and fees, establish enquiry points).
    • Simplified documentation (e.g., allowing electronic payment of duties, accepting electronic copies).
    • Risk management and post-clearance audits (to expedite release of low-risk shipments).
    • Disciplines on fees and penalties (they should be commensurate and not arbitrary).
    • Faster procedures for perishable goods and reduced formalities for authorized operators with good compliance records.
  • Expected benefits: By standard estimates, full implementation of the TFA could reduce trade costs by an average of 14% globally, with the largest gains for developing and least-developed countries where border delays were longest. This can boost trade flows significantly – some analyses projected world GDP gains of several hundred billion dollars per year. For example, if a shipment that used to take a week to clear customs can clear in a day, exporters (say a textile producer) can get goods to market faster and cheaper, and importers (like an electronics assembler needing parts) can maintain leaner inventories. Countries like India, with historically high logistics costs and complex border procedures, stood to gain by making its ports and land borders more efficient, enhancing competitiveness of its exports (ranging from apparel to agricultural produce) and lowering costs for importing raw materials and components for industry.
  • Special and differential treatment in TFA: Recognizing varied capacities, the TFA built in an innovative implementation mechanism:
    • Each developing country could categorize the provisions into: Category A (implement upon the TFA’s entry into force, or within 1 year for least-developed), Category B (implement after a self-declared transition period), and Category C (implement upon receiving necessary technical assistance/capacity building). This allowed countries to proceed at a pace commensurate with their administrative ability and infrastructure readiness.
    • India, for instance, promptly notified many measures under Category A (like publication of information, as it already had a transparent system for customs laws online), but took time on others that required new systems (such as setting up a national single window for trade documents, which it put under Category B/C with a timeline and assistance needs).
    • Donor countries and international organizations committed to provide support for capacity-building – e.g., training customs officials, funding automation systems in poorer countries – to ensure the benefits of TFA could be realized broadly.
• Agricultural and food security elements:
  • Public stockholding for food security: This was a critical issue for countries like India that purchase food staples (like rice and wheat) at government-set prices to build stocks for distribution to low-income populations. Such purchases at above-market prices can be considered trade-distorting domestic support under WTO agriculture rules (counted in the “Aggregate Measurement of Support” with certain limits). India’s Food Security Act, implemented in 2013 to supply subsidized grain to around two-thirds of its population, raised concern it might breach those subsidy limits as minimum support prices rose.
    • In Bali, members agreed on a temporary “peace clause”: if a developing country’s public stockholding programs violate the subsidy limit commitments, other members will not file a legal challenge under the WTO, provided the program meets certain transparency conditions and is for food security. This was an interim solution until a permanent resolution could be found.
    • India was the prime driver for this outcome. It argued that without such protection, its vital food security schemes could be jeopardized by trade rules that had become outdated (as the subsidy limits were set in the 1980s prices, not accounting for inflation or the need for large-scale grain procurement). The peace clause assuaged immediate fears and allowed India to agree to the TFA. However, India made clear it sought a permanent amendment to WTO rules to exempt these public stockholding programs entirely from subsidy calculations, a battle it would continue to fight in subsequent years.
    • As part of the compromise, India and the US reached an understanding in 2014 ensuring the peace clause would remain until a permanent solution was found (essentially making the interim protection open-ended in practice). This reaffirmed that countries like India could continue procuring food for food security without WTO litigation risk for the time being.
  • Other modest agricultural outcomes:
    • Members agreed to more flexibility and transparency in how tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for agriculture are administered. Often, quotas (allowing a set volume of imports at a lower tariff) were under-filled due to cumbersome licensing methods. The Bali decision encouraged quota holders to liberalize allocation if quotas aren’t being filled, so that export opportunities (for say, farmers in developing countries looking to sell sugar or meat into a quota in a rich market) do not go unused.
    • A program called “Export Competition” (addressing export subsidies and similar measures) was discussed, and members agreed to keep progress going – laying groundwork that eventually led to the 2015 agreement to eliminate export subsidies entirely.
• Development initiatives and LDC package:
  • Several decisions in Bali addressed issues specific to Least Developed Countries and development more broadly:
    • Duty-Free, Quota-Free Access: There was a reaffirmation for developed countries (and developing countries in a position to do so) to improve or fully implement duty-free, quota-free market access for LDC exports. While not new (the commitment dates back to earlier ministerials), Bali sought to nudge members to hit the target of 97% coverage or more. Countries like Bangladesh or Nepal (LDCs) benefitted from such schemes in major markets for products like garments.
    • Preferential Rules of Origin: A set of guidelines was adopted to make it easier for LDC exports to qualify for preferential access. The idea was to simplify and relax the criteria (such as percentage of value addition required in the LDC) so that more products from LDCs could be considered “made in [LDC]” and enjoy tariff preferences. This is key for small economies that often import materials then process them; strict rules of origin previously disqualified many of their exports from tariff perks.
    • Services waiver for LDCs: WTO members had agreed earlier to permit preferential treatment for LDCs in services trade (waiving the MFN obligation for such preferences). In Bali, there was encouragement to make this operational – essentially urging countries to offer concrete preferences (like allowing an extra number of nurses or IT professionals from LDCs, or lower entry visa fees, etc.). Additionally, the waiver was extended in subsequent meetings to ensure LDCs could actually benefit.
    • Monitoring Mechanism: Bali established a Monitoring Mechanism to review how special and differential treatment provisions (which give developing countries leeway in various WTO agreements) are being implemented and to consider proposals for improving them. This was a response to long-standing developing country calls that many S&D provisions were “best-endeavor” and not effective, so a systematic review process was needed.
• India’s strategic gains and compromises:
  • India came into Bali emphasizing food security and left with the essential guarantee it sought (the peace clause), which was a domestic political win. It also strongly supported the LDC package, aligning with countries pushing for development outcomes.
  • Embracing the TFA was a shift for India, which traditionally was cautious about agreements requiring significant implementation efforts. India calculated that many TFA measures were in its own interest to modernize trade procedures. Indeed, post-Bali, India invested in port upgrades, a single window clearance system, and streamlined customs—moves that have since cut its average cargo clearance times. Being part of TFA also allowed India to shape its provisions: for instance, India ensured that the agreement included language recognizing countries’ need to cooperate on preventing illegal trade (to keep a handle on smuggling) and technical assistance aspects.
  • However, India also warned that the Bali deal should not be seen as the end, but as a stepping stone. It insisted that other pending issues of the Doha Round – from agricultural subsidy constraints to development flexibilities – must continue to be negotiated. This stance sometimes put India at odds with developed members who hoped that success at Bali could pivot the WTO away from the Doha agenda and towards new issues. India’s position was clear that without addressing the imbalances in agricultural trade and development, it would be hard to engage on future agendas.
• Outcome: The Bali Package’s adoption in December 2013 was hailed as a victory for multilateralism. It broke a nearly two-decade drought in WTO’s negotiating function (since the Uruguay Round) for delivering new global trade rules. For many developing countries, it proved that even a more limited agenda could yield results that directly benefit them (e.g., through trade facilitation improvements and the food security assurance). The energy from Bali was intended to carry into subsequent years to tackle remaining difficult topics.

The Nairobi Package (2015)

• Overview of the 10th Ministerial Conference: In December 2015, WTO members met in Nairobi, Kenya for the Tenth Ministerial Conference (MC10). This was the first WTO ministerial in Africa, and expectations were focused on addressing some key issues of the Doha Round that could not be postponed further, especially in agriculture, while confronting the broader question of the Doha Round’s future. The “Nairobi Package” that emerged included significant decisions on agriculture and benefits for least-developed countries, although it also exposed division over the continuation of Doha talks:
  • The conference yielded a Ministerial Declaration with sections that were not unanimously agreed – particularly paragraphs concerning the reaffirmation (or lack thereof) of the Doha mandate. This hinted at a splintering consensus on how to approach future negotiations, with some members indicating a desire to explore new subjects beyond Doha’s framework.
  • Despite the divergence on process, substantive agreements in Nairobi did mark an important incremental progress, especially the commitment to end agricultural export subsidies, which was the last remaining export-related distortion from the original Doha objectives.
• Elimination of agricultural export subsidies:
  • Perhaps the most headline achievement of Nairobi was the decision to eliminate agricultural export subsidies – the WTO members agreed to a historic reform by banning these subsidies outright. This built on the earlier pledge (from 2005 and reaffirmed in Bali) and gave it concrete form:
    • Developed countries agreed to remove all remaining agriculture export subsidies immediately (with a very short extension to 2020 for a few products in certain countries). Developing countries agreed to do so by 2018, with exceptions allowing them to continue subsidizing transportation and marketing for agricultural exports until 2023.
    • The significance of this cannot be overstated: export subsidies, once widely used particularly by the European Union (for example, dumping excess dairy, sugar, and beef on world markets with subsidy support), had been disciplined somewhat by the Uruguay Round but not eliminated. Now, the legal permission to use such subsidies was completely revoked. This change leveled the playing field for agricultural trade by preventing wealthier nations from offloading surpluses at artificially low prices – a practice that had undermined farmers in competitive developing countries. For instance, countries like Brazil, Thailand (in sugar), and many others in cereals or dairy markets saw this as a long-sought victory.
    • The immediate practical impact was mitigated by the fact that most major players had already significantly reduced export subsidies by 2015 (the EU had drastically cut spending on export refunds through CAP reforms, and the US relied on export credits and food aid rather than explicit subsidies). However, binding this in the WTO locked in the policy shift and prevented backsliding in the future.
    • As an example, India historically did not use export subsidies extensively except in rare cases (like occasional sugar export incentives or transport subsidies for certain crops), and under the decision it, like others, agreed to cease these. India’s interest was more in ensuring others (like the EU) did not revert to old ways. This outcome also directed attention to other forms of export support such as export credit guarantees and state trading enterprises, where disciplines were tightened (members agreed to guidelines to ensure export financing is on commercial terms, and international food aid should not distort markets).
  • Together with the earlier Trade Facilitation Agreement, eliminating export subsidies demonstrated that even if comprehensive Doha trade-offs were stalled, specific Doha promises could be harvested over time.
• Other agriculture-related outcomes:
  • Cotton: There was a specific decision benefiting cotton-exporting least-developed countries (especially a group of West African countries often called the C4 – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali – who had championed cotton trade reform). Developed countries agreed to grant duty-free, quota-free market access for cotton exports from LDCs, and all export subsidies for cotton were to be eliminated (which for the U.S. meant formally ending its remaining export credit guarantees for cotton). While this addressed export competition, more contentious domestic subsidies for cotton (like the U.S. support programs that the WTO had previously ruled against in a case brought by Brazil) remained a concern, though outside the scope of what Nairobi resolved.
    • The cotton decision was symbolically important: cotton had been called a “litmus test” for development in trade talks – poor African nations argued it was hypocritical for rich countries to preach free trade while subsidizing cotton farmers (in the U.S., for example) in ways that depressed world prices and hurt African farmers. The Nairobi outcome at least fulfilled one piece of that puzzle by ensuring no export subsidies would further push prices down, and by improving market access for LDC cotton. It fell short of an overall fix to cotton subsidies but marked progress aligned with the development theme.
  • Public stockholding and Special Safeguard Mechanism: These two issues were key demands from developing countries like India and the G33 alliance, but Nairobi saw only incremental movement:
    • On public stockholding for food security, members essentially committed to continue negotiations towards a permanent solution (with a target to achieve one by the next Ministerial). They reaffirmed the Bali interim solution (peace clause) remains in effect. In Nairobi’s context, India and others insisted that this issue not be sidelined; while no final resolution came, the re-dedication to solve it kept it on the agenda.
    • Regarding a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for developing countries (a proposed tool to allow temporary tariff hikes on agriculture in face of import surges or price dips), the Nairobi declaration acknowledged it and instructed that negotiations on an SSM would continue. However, agreement on actually implementing an SSM was not reached, largely due to opposition from exporting countries who feared it would impede market access. India and allies were disappointed, as they had hoped Nairobi might at least outline a framework for SSM usage. The clash was the same as in 2008: exporters (like the US, some Latin Americans) worry SSM could be overused; import-sensitive nations see it as vital for farmer safeguards.
  • Export restrictions: A minor but notable agreement was a declaration to encourage governments to be mindful of not imposing export bans or restrictions on food in a way that would adversely affect food-importing countries or humanitarian needs. Specifically, there was mention that if a country restricts food exports, it should consider the food security of importing partners and ideally notify the WTO. This was not a binding rule but a gentle commitment – important to some countries in Africa or the Middle East that rely on imports, so they sought to restrain ad hoc export bans that could cause price spikes. (Years later, this theme would recur strongly at the 2022 Ministerial due to export bans during crises.)
• Development and LDC issues:
  • The Nairobi package contained several decisions geared towards least-developed countries and development:
    • Rules of Origin for LDCs: Members adopted detailed guidelines to further simplify and liberalize rules of origin for LDC products under preferential trade schemes. For example, allowing a higher percentage of non-local inputs in an LDC’s exports while still qualifying as originating from the LDC. This measure helps LDC-based manufacturers who often import materials (like an apparel factory in Bangladesh importing fabric from China – under easier rules, the final garment could still get duty-free entry into, say, the EU as a “Bangladesh-origin” good).
    • LDC Services Waiver: There was encouragement and some progress on operationalizing the services waiver. By Nairobi, dozens of WTO members had indicated sectors or modes where they would give preferences to LDCs (for instance, waiving visa fees for LDC service suppliers, or not requiring certain work experience for LDC professionals). The Nairobi decision extended the waiver period and pushed members to make those offers meaningful. This was aimed at helping LDCs like Nepal or Tanzania leverage their potential in areas like tourism or nursing services abroad.
    • E-commerce and SMEs: The ministerial declaration continued a practice since 1998 of a temporary moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions (renewed again in Nairobi) and pledged continued examination of e-commerce’s trade implications. While not a new concession, it maintained the status quo that cross-border digital flows (like software, music downloads) wouldn’t face tariffs, pleasing tech-exporting nations; but some developing countries were starting to question this moratorium’s impact on revenue and industrialization (India among them). Additionally, there was recognition of initiatives to assist small economies and small businesses (though these were largely hortatory).
    • Aid for Trade and technical assistance: Nairobi reaffirmed support for the Aid for Trade initiative, which channels development assistance into building trade capacity in developing countries – whether it’s upgrading infrastructure, training exporters, or modernizing regulations. For LDCs and other low-income countries, such aid is critical to actually benefit from WTO rules and market openings.
• Reflection on the Doha Round’s fate:
  • A core tension at Nairobi was whether to formally continue or close the Doha Round. The Ministerial Declaration ended up acknowledging disagreement: “many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda… other Members do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary to achieve meaningful outcomes.”
  • In effect, this meant the WTO would no longer be strictly bound to negotiating only under the Doha Round single undertaking modality. It opened the door to exploring other issues and approaches (including plurilaterals or new topics like e-commerce, investment facilitation, etc.), even as work could still carry on for unresolved Doha topics (agriculture, fisheries subsidies – the latter had become a pressing issue by then).
  • India and many developing countries voiced disappointment at this shift. They feared that prematurely declaring “Doha is over” would remove pressure to fix the imbalances in trade rules that Doha was supposed to address, especially those affecting developing economies. From India’s perspective, issues like protective measures for farmers, reductions in developed-country farm support, and special treatment for developing industries were still unresolved and highly relevant. India argued that abandoning the development agenda would betray the promise made at Doha.
  • On the other side, the US, EU, and some others contended that after 14 years of stalemate, it was time to try new negotiation paradigms, focusing on pragmatic deals and contemporary issues (like digital trade). Nairobi thus ended without a unified vision of how the next round or phase of WTO negotiations would look, merely an uneasy compromise that allowed everyone to maintain their position. The scene was set for the WTO to gradually pivot in the coming years towards more flexible negotiating clubs (as seen in 2017) and targeted agreements, while the broad Doha package remained shelved.
• India’s takeaways:
  • India supported the concrete gains at Nairobi, like the export subsidy elimination (which aligned with India’s interest in fair agri trade) and the LDC measures (consistent with India’s stance as a leader in South-South cooperation). India had already unilaterally provided duty-free access to LDCs in Asia/Africa for most products since 2008, so it welcomed others following suit.
  • However, India was openly critical of any implication that Doha’s development mandate could be disregarded. The Indian Commerce Minister at Nairobi insisted that development issues must remain central and that unfinished business like the special safeguard mechanism and public stockholding cannot be swept away. India also expressed reservations on starting talks on new issues like e-commerce governance, preferring to reinforce and conclude what was started in 2001.
  • In summary, the Nairobi Ministerial delivered meaningful, if limited, reforms that benefitted the global trading system and developing countries, but it also underscored a philosophical split among WTO members. It showcased India’s dual role: on one hand cooperating to achieve incremental progress, and on the other, standing firm as a guardian of the original development agenda in the face of pressure to move on.

The Buenos Aires Ministerial (2017)

• Challenging backdrop for the 11th Ministerial: The WTO’s Eleventh Ministerial Conference (MC11) took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina in December 2017. Unlike previous conferences that yielded packages of agreements, Buenos Aires reflected deepening divisions and produced no major multilateral negotiated outcomes. It was held at a time when global trade tensions were rising and key players were less inclined to compromise:
  • The United States, under a new administration in 2017, expressed skepticism about the multilateral trading system, blocking even usually routine statements. The U.S. delegation questioned the value of the WTO’s negotiating arm, focusing instead on perceived institutional imbalances (like what it viewed as judicial overreach in disputes).
  • Many developing countries, including India, were frustrated that their priority issues (like the agriculture safeguard or stockholding solution) had not been delivered, yet advanced economies were pushing to discuss new topics (like e-commerce rules, investment facilitation) which developing members were wary of. This clash of priorities hindered consensus.
  • The result was that for the first time in WTO history, a Ministerial ended without a unanimously agreed ministerial declaration. Members could not agree on language reaffirming the commitment to the multilateral trading system and the Doha Development Agenda in the same way as before, due to U.S. objections and differences over future work.
• Little progress on traditional issues:
  • Agriculture negotiations remained stuck. India and others continued to demand a permanent solution to the public stockholding issue, essentially an amendment to WTO rules to exempt such food security programs from subsidy limits. Despite extensive discussions, no consensus emerged in Buenos Aires; the interim peace clause held but without new guidelines or clear endgame, leaving the issue unresolved.
  • Similarly, the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for developing countries in agriculture saw no breakthrough. Exporters maintained opposition, and the conference concluded with only an agreement to “continue to engage constructively” on these topics.
  • Some minor decisions were made to extend existing moratoria: members agreed to keep the moratorium on e-commerce customs duties (as they had every two years since 1998), and to continue the moratorium on “non-violation” complaints under TRIPS (meaning countries won’t bring dispute cases claiming they were deprived of expected IP benefits without an actual agreement violation). These were essentially status-quo continuations rather than new achievements.
• Rise of Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs): A noteworthy development at Buenos Aires was that groups of members launched plurilateral discussions via “Joint Statement Initiatives” on various topics. These initiatives were not officially part of the unanimous Ministerial decisions (since not all members joined), but they signaled a shift towards like-minded coalitions pursuing trade rule updates:
  • E-commerce JSI: 71 members (including the EU, US, Japan, China, Brazil, and others) announced they would initiate exploratory work toward future WTO negotiations on electronic commerce. This involved issues like data flows, digital products, cybersecurity, etc. Importantly, India (along with a handful of others like South Africa) did not join this initiative. India was (and remains) concerned that global e-commerce rules could constrain its digital economy policy options and that developing nations’ interests (like digital industrialization or taxation rights) might be sidelined. India has also been vocal about analyzing the impact of the e-commerce moratorium on its customs revenue and on domestic digital businesses before any binding rules are made.
  • Investment Facilitation JSI: 70 members declared an initiative on developing multilateral rules on investment facilitation (not covering market access or investment protection, but rather simplifying procedures for investors, improving transparency, helping investment flows, etc.). India chose not to participate, as it had reservations about bringing investment issues into the WTO sphere – reflecting back to the rejected Singapore issues – preferring to handle them via bilateral treaties.
  • MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises) JSI: Another group of 87 members set up a working group to address obstacles smaller companies face in trade (like cumbersome regulations or lack of information). India was not initially part of this MSME initiative either, concerned it might prelude rules that favor developed countries’ small businesses or distract from development issues.
  • Trade and Gender: A non-negotiating declaration was endorsed by 118 members (including many developing countries and developed ones) to promote women’s economic empowerment through trade. India notably did not sign this declaration, arguing that gender was not a trade issue per se to be negotiated at WTO and expressing concern it could be a way to bring in social issues that might later convert into trade conditions. This surprised some observers given India’s commitment to gender equality; however, India maintained that while it supports women’s empowerment, the WTO might not be the appropriate forum for such declarations.
  • These JSIs indicated a pragmatic approach by many members to advance discussions on topics they view as important, even if the full WTO membership could not reach consensus to launch formal negotiations in those areas. They also highlighted a risk: the WTO’s centrality could be weakened if rule-making splinters into clubs. India and some others raised exactly that worry – that such plurilateral talks outside the consensus principle might marginalize countries not at the table and lead to rules that they could be pressured to accept later without having influenced them.
• Developing versus developed tensions: The Buenos Aires meeting underscored the persistent divergences:
  • Developing countries, led by India, China, South Africa, the Africa Group, and others, submitted a firm statement during MC11 reaffirming the Doha Development Agenda and insisting that new issues should not divert attention from outstanding development-centric issues. They stressed special and differential treatment must remain integral in any future negotiations, meaning any new agreements should accommodate the differences in capacities.
  • Developed countries like the US, EU, Japan, and others were clearly pivoting away from the Doha framework. The US in particular was disengaged from the negotiations aspect, focusing more on institutional criticisms (it had already begun blocking appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by 2017, causing strain in the dispute system).
  • The outcome was effectively a stalemate on formal consensus, but with a subtext that a significant part of the membership was moving on to alternative modes of progress. This was an uncomfortable scenario for a consensus-driven body – it maintained unity in name only.
• India’s role at MC11:
  • India went to Buenos Aires prioritizing agricultural issues (public stockholding and SSM) and resisting what it saw as premature or one-sided pushes on e-commerce and other new themes. The Indian delegation worked closely with other developing country coalitions to block any outcome that might close the door on the Doha mandate or institutionalize new talks without consent of all.
  • At one point, India and allies were prepared to let the e-commerce moratorium lapse to force a discussion on its implications, but ultimately the moratorium was extended. Instead, India succeeded in getting language in place for members to have structured discussions on the e-commerce moratorium’s scope and impact in the period ahead, keeping the issue alive.
  • When it became clear no consensus declaration was possible, India (with others) ensured that its perspective was at least recorded in the chair’s summary or separate statements. The Indian Commerce Minister emphasized that development issues need re-energizing and cautioned against diluting the multilateral trading system’s inclusive, consensus-driven nature.
• Post-Buenos Aires reflection: MC11 was sobering for the WTO. It underscored the difficulty of achieving unanimous agreements in a diverse membership on any meaningful liberalization at that time. It also marked the acceleration of plurilateral work within the WTO context as a practical alternative.
  • For countries like India, it posed a strategic dilemma: whether to engage with these plurilateral talks to influence them from inside or to stay out on principle and uphold the multilateral ideal. Up to 2017, India largely chose the latter for issues it was uncomfortable with (like e-commerce, investment), which meant ceding the conversation to others for the time being. India’s calculation was that jumping into negotiations that might produce rules favoring developed economies without guarantees on development flexibilities could be harmful; better to hold back and insist that any outcomes eventually be agreed by consensus or not bind non-participants.
  • Buenos Aires, in essence, was a turning point that signaled the end of the WTO’s era of grand rounds and ushered in a period of pragmatism and fragmentation. It set the stage for the WTO to focus next on narrower issues where a deal was conceivable (like fisheries subsidies), as well as to grapple with institutional challenges. India’s stance remained that even if negotiating approaches evolved, the core principle of fairness and development orientation must not be lost.

The Geneva Ministerial (2022 – 12th WTO MC)

• A delayed but pivotal conference: The Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) was originally due in 2020 in Kazakhstan, but was postponed multiple times due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It ultimately took place in Geneva in June 2022 with ministers attending under strict health measures. The world had changed significantly since 2017, with the pandemic, rising US-China trade tensions, and even a war in Europe (the Russia-Ukraine conflict) affecting food and energy security. Despite these challenges, MC12 delivered a set of concrete outcomes, often dubbed the “Geneva Package,” reviving confidence that the WTO can still function to produce agreements in critical areas:
  • Unlike Buenos Aires, MC12 did have a ministerial declaration, though focused on the specific decisions made. Members demonstrated flexibility by extending the conference by two extra days to push agreements across the finish line. The geopolitical strains (with some members not on speaking terms due to sanctions and war) made consensus-building extremely delicate, but the shared interest in the multilateral system’s credibility prevailed.
  • India played a key and high-profile role at Geneva, engaging actively on all major topics – a reflection of its continued commitment to shaping the multilateral outcomes in line with its interests and those of developing peers.
• Fisheries Subsidies Agreement: A landmark achievement of MC12 was the conclusion of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, the first new binding multilateral agreement on trade rules since the Uruguay Round’s conclusion (aside from the smaller Trade Facilitation pact).
  • Objective: This agreement targets harmful subsidies that contribute to overfishing and depletion of marine resources. Negotiations had been ongoing for over two decades (since the Doha Round mandate in 2001 to clarify and improve fishery subsidy disciplines, later bolstered by Sustainable Development Goal 14.6 which set 2020 as a deadline to ban certain fish subsidies).
  • Key provisions:
    • It prohibits subsidies for illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. If a fishing vessel or operator is found engaged in IUU fishing (as determined by national authorities or regional fisheries organizations), governments must stop any subsidies to them. This creates a trade deterrent against IUU fishing, which is a major problem, accounting for up to 1 in 5 fish caught globally.
    • It bans subsidies for fishing of overfished stocks – if scientists determine a stock is overfished (meaning its population is below sustainable levels), governments shouldn’t subsidize fishing that stock, unless such subsidies are for rebuilding the stock.
    • It curbs subsidies for fishing on the high seas (areas outside any country’s exclusive economic zone) that are not regulated by an international agreement or organization. This is aimed at unmanaged fisheries where subsidies could lead to a free-for-all in international waters.
    • There is recognition that disciplines on subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing (like subsidies for new boats or fuel) need further negotiation. Members agreed to continue talks to extend the rules to these broader categories within 4 years (with the agreement to have comprehensive rules at the next stage).
  • Special & Differential Treatment (S&DT): Developing countries secured some exemptions, though less extensive than some sought:
    • A two-year transition period for developing countries (and 7 years for least-developed countries) to implement the IUU fishing subsidy prohibition within their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs). This gives them time to improve fisheries management and oversight domestically. For example, if a developing country has small-scale fishers who might not have all licenses in order (thus technically IUU), it has 2 years to get systems in place before the subsidy ban fully applies in its EEZ.
    • Carve-outs for certain small-scale, artisanal fishing: the agreement allows subsidies for fishing within a country’s territorial waters (generally 12 nautical miles from the coast) to continue, recognizing that artisanal fishermen in local waters rely on government support for their livelihood and that this fishing is typically not what causes major stock depletion. This was a key demand of India – with its vast coastline and many poor fishing communities, India argued its subsidies (like fuel support for traditional boats) are minimal compared to large industrial fleets, and are essential for subsistence.
    • However, India had initially asked for a blanket 25-year exemption for developing countries before any subsidy prohibitions kick in, to build up their fisheries capacities. The final deal did not grant such a long grace period (which some other countries feared would negate the purpose of the rules for a generation), but it did incorporate flexibilities as described. India expressed some disappointment at not getting a longer exemption but ultimately supported the consensus, recognizing the importance of the pact and presumably calculating that it could live with the terms secured.
  • Impact and significance: The agreement’s immediate impact is as much about environmental sustainability as trade fairness. Roughly $22 billion of the estimated $35 billion in annual global fisheries subsidies are considered harmful (encouraging overfishing). Major subsidizers include China, the EU, the US, Japan, and others. With this deal, for example, China – the world’s largest marine fishing nation – would have to stop subsidizing fuel or vessel costs for any boats caught fishing illegally, or on the high seas outside of regulated areas. Over time, if extended to all overcapacity subsidies, it could reduce the subsidized competitive edge of large fleets, potentially benefiting small-scale fishers in coastal developing countries by improving fish stocks and leveling competition.
    • Developing countries with limited capacity also got a new WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism set up to provide technical assistance and capacity building for fisheries management – to help them meet the agreement’s requirements (like monitoring and enforcement against illegal fishing).
    • The fisheries deal bolsters the WTO’s credibility in contributing to global issues beyond traditional trade, aligning trade rules with sustainable development goals. It’s notable that it’s the first WTO agreement explicitly focused on environmental objectives.
• Trade and health: TRIPS COVID-19 Waiver Decision: Another high-profile outcome was a decision related to the TRIPS Agreement, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. After intense debate, members agreed on a targeted waiver of certain intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines:
  • Content of the decision: The measure allows WTO members to authorize companies to produce and distribute COVID-19 vaccines (and ingredients or components) without the patent holder’s permission, through what is akin to an expanded compulsory license. Specifically, it waives the requirement in TRIPS Article 31(f) which normally limits compulsory license production predominantly for the domestic market. Under this decision, an eligible country can produce and export vaccines to other eligible countries (essentially all developing countries) with fewer procedural hurdles for a period of 5 years.
  • Only developing countries that contributed less than 10% of global vaccine exports in 2021 can use this (which basically excludes China by that criterion, as China had a large vaccine export share). Developed countries are not eligible importers or exporters under this waiver, since the idea is to boost production in the developing world.
  • Background: This outcome was far narrower than what India and South Africa originally proposed in 2020 – a broad waiver of patent, trade secret, industrial design and copyright obligations under TRIPS for all COVID-19 medical products (vaccines, medicines, tests, equipment) for the duration of the pandemic. That sweeping proposal was backed by dozens of developing countries and civil society groups who argued IP was a barrier to scaling up production of needed supplies especially in low-income countries.
    • The EU, UK, Switzerland and some others resisted a broad waiver, contending that IP was not the main barrier (pointing to issues like manufacturing capacity and supply chains) and fearing damage to the patent system’s incentives. After 18 months of negotiations and pressure, a compromise focusing just on vaccines was crafted, mainly through talks among the US, EU, India, and South Africa (the “Quad”).
  • Reaction and implications: The decision is seen as a limited victory for developing countries. It affirms the principle that in a public health emergency, flexible interpretations of TRIPS can be used to expand production. However, because by mid-2022 vaccine supply was no longer the critical bottleneck (production had ramped up globally, though distribution and demand were issues), some argued the waiver came too late to significantly improve vaccine equity. Also, the exclusion of treatments and tests was a sore point. The Geneva decision did include a mandate to decide within 6 months (by end of 2022) on whether to extend the waiver to cover COVID-19 therapeutics and diagnostics – an ongoing debate that saw pushback from pharmaceutical interests.
    • For India, which is a major vaccine and generic medicines producer, the waiver was of both practical and symbolic importance. Practically, Indian companies already licensed to make vaccines (like Covishield under license from AstraZeneca) didn’t need the waiver, but if needed India could now authorize production of other vaccines or their inputs without fear of WTO dispute. Symbolically, India had been a key leader pushing for the waiver, highlighting its commitment to public health needs of developing nations. The compromise fell short of what it wanted, but India supported it as a step forward and continues to advocate for extending it to therapeutics (for example, to make generic versions of new COVID antiviral drugs).
    • This health-related outcome also reflects an evolution of the trade agenda: recognizing that trade rules on IP should not impede responses to global crises. It adds to the legacy of the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, reinforcing the WTO’s role in facilitating access to medicines.
• Food security and World Food Programme (WFP):
  • Responding to the food supply anxieties exacerbated by the Ukraine war in 2022 and pandemic disruptions, members reached a decision on food security that had humanitarian significance:
    • WTO members agreed not to impose export prohibitions or restrictions on foodstuffs purchased for humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme. In other words, if the WFP is buying grain to alleviate a famine somewhere, countries shouldn’t block those shipments even if they have an export ban in place domestically. This was a direct response to incidents where export bans, such as those on wheat or rice, inadvertently hampered relief efforts.
    • The decision includes a clause that allows a member to override this obligation if it deems it necessary for its own essential security interests (a nod to sovereignty), but even then it must consult and notify. Overall, it creates a strong normative commitment to prioritize hunger relief over protectionist instincts during crises.
    • This was a relatively easy win as most members find it hard to justify blocking humanitarian food aid. India fully supported this decision and in fact had taken care, when imposing a sudden wheat export ban in May 2022 due to heatwave-reduced crops, to clarify it would still allow exports to countries in need and to the WFP. So this aligned with India’s policy stance as well.
  • More broadly on food security, the Geneva package echoed earlier commitments: it stressed that members will continue work toward a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security (the issue India champions) and to discuss ways to improve the functioning of agricultural markets. Though no binding result on these topics was reached, simply getting mention alongside critical global issues kept them on the WTO agenda. India ensured that its concerns remained visible, particularly as 2022’s global food inflation reminded everyone that food security isn’t a solved issue.
• E-commerce moratorium and digital trade:
  • The contentious issue of the moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions saw compromise once again. Members agreed to extend the moratorium (in place since 1998) until the next Ministerial Conference or until March 2024, whichever comes first. Importantly, they also agreed to have deeper discussions on the definition and scope of what is covered by the moratorium, and on its impact on developing countries, before the next decision.
  • India and some other developing countries have raised concerns that the moratorium might cause revenue losses (for example, as digital trade in movies, software, etc. grows, governments forgo tariffs they could have imposed on physical media or packaged software in earlier eras). They also worry that it could deny developing countries a policy tool to nurture their digital industries. However, opponents of lifting the moratorium argue tariffs would impede the digital economy and increase costs for consumers and businesses who rely on data flows.
  • At MC12, India voiced these concerns but ultimately joined consensus to extend, in part because a sudden lapse could have created uncertainty and because others signaled willingness to at least study the issue’s implications. The outcome gave India a partial win by scheduling analytical work on e-commerce – meaning its arguments on revenue and development will get a formal hearing – while kicking the can down the road for a definitive decision.
  • Meanwhile, separate from the formal WTO work, plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce rules (the JSI which India is not part of) continued among a subset of members. The tension between those plural discussions and the multilateral moratorium debate reflects a dual-track approach on digital trade. India remains outside the plurilateral, focusing instead on shaping the general membership stance through these moratorium debates.
• WTO Reform Pledge: Recognizing the challenges the organization faces, MC12 included a commitment to undertake reforms to improve the WTO’s functions. While this was not a detailed plan, it acknowledged:
  • The urgency of restoring a fully functioning dispute settlement system by 2024. This refers to the Appellate Body paralysis since 2019, after the US blocked new judge appointments, leading to the system’s quasi-breakdown. By setting 2024 as a target, members agreed in principle to address the concerns and proposals (coming up with a process that the US finds acceptable while preserving binding dispute resolution).
  • The need to update the WTO rulebook to reflect current economic realities – this could entail discussions on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises (an issue pushed by US/EU due to China), digital trade, and more effective transparency from members on their trade measures. Developing countries including India are cautious that such “reforms” don’t undermine core principles like special and differential treatment or consensus decision-making. For instance, some developed members want to “differentiate” or graduate certain advanced developing countries out of S&DT, which India and others oppose.
  • Nevertheless, India supports institutional improvements and has its own asks (e.g., making the Secretariat more representative, enhancing technical assistance, ensuring rules on subsidies capture the asymmetry between big subsidizers and small ones). So India is an active participant in the reforms discussion, but as with everything, emphasizes that development and fairness must guide the process.
• India’s influence and outcomes at MC12:
  • By many accounts, India was a major dealmaker and blocker-when-needed at Geneva. The Indian Commerce Minister attended with a robust mandate to protect core interests (agriculture and fisheries flexibility, access to medicines) and to push offensive interests (fisheries deal for sustainability, securing outcomes on its proposals).
  • On fisheries, India held out until near the end to secure better terms for developing countries, particularly a carve-out for traditional fishing. India’s staunch stance (along with others) prevented a potential scenario where a big subsidizer deal could have been made without adequate S&DT. Though not all of India’s demands were met, the fact that an agreement was reached that India could accept was itself a testament to compromise – India didn’t want to be seen as derailing a global sustainability deal, but it ensured its small fishers wouldn’t be immediately disadvantaged.
  • On the TRIPS waiver, India’s persistent campaigning since 2020 helped keep the issue on the agenda against considerable opposition. The final text was trimmed down, but India endorsed it as a necessary half-step and pledged to continue fighting for therapeutics. This also aligned with India’s image as a champion of vaccine equity (it had exported millions of doses to poorer nations under its “Vaccine Maitri” initiative and wanted WTO rules supportive of such efforts).
  • In the agriculture domain, India made sure that food security remained front and center. It co-sponsored the WFP exemption and obtained reiteration on public stockholding talks. While tangible resolution on stockholding remains elusive, India’s insistence means it will be a litmus test for MC13.
  • The overall Geneva Package was seen as fairly balanced: it had something significant for trade development (fisheries), something for public health (vaccine IP), something for food security, and a path forward on reform. India, representing a large developing country perspective, was satisfied enough to hail MC12 as a success, a contrast to its frustration after MC11.
• Looking ahead post-2022: The agreements reached will need implementation:
  • Countries must formally accept the fisheries agreement (it will enter into force once two-thirds of members ratify it domestically). India will undertake its internal process and calibrate any subsidy schemes to comply – fortunately, India’s current subsidies are mostly within allowed parameters (it doesn’t subsidize distant-water fleets like some nations do), so compliance is more about monitoring and enforcement against IUU fishing.
  • The TRIPS decision needed follow-up if therapeutics/diagnostics are to be included; India supports that extension.
  • The clock ticks toward 2024 for dispute settlement reform – an issue India cares about since it has multiple disputes in limbo due to the Appellate Body’s absence (including ones where it challenged US steel tariffs and renewable energy measures).
  • The newfound momentum will be tested at the next Ministerial (MC13, which is slated for early 2024 in Abu Dhabi). If members, including India, can ride the goodwill from Geneva to solve the stockholding puzzle or agree on digital trade principles, it will further restore the WTO’s luster. If not, the risk of fragmentation remains.
• In summary, the Geneva MC12 was a critical juncture where WTO members, after a long drought, proved that compromise is still attainable. It balanced trade, health, and environmental issues, reflecting an evolving understanding that the WTO’s mandate intersects with global challenges. For India and many developing countries, MC12’s outcomes were validation that persistent advocacy for equitable rules can yield results, and that the WTO is worth investing effort in – as a forum where even a developing country can exercise influence to shape international economic governance.

Conclusion

From the first post-war tariff negotiations in Geneva in 1947 to the multi-issue deals reached in Geneva 2022, the rounds of GATT and WTO talks have progressively broadened the scope of trade rules and the inclusiveness of the trading system. Each round built on the last: cutting industrial tariffs, beginning to discipline agriculture and textiles, and eventually tackling services, intellectual property, and today’s pressing issues like sustainable fishing and pandemic response. The journey highlights how trade negotiations mirror global economic shifts and power dynamics. Early rounds were dominated by a few industrial powers, but over time developing countries gained a stronger voice – from India’s push for special treatment in the 1960s, to coalition-building in the Doha Round, and proactive agenda-setting in recent ministerials. The outcomes of these talks have shaped the opportunities and constraints nations face in pursuing development through trade. For instance, the reduction of tariffs and quotas opened markets for exports that spurred growth in many countries, while new rules on services and IP integrated emerging economies into a more complex global regime. India’s experience – from being a rule-follower in GATT’s infancy to a key negotiator in the WTO era – epitomizes the balancing act between leveraging global trade for growth and safeguarding domestic development needs. As we reflect on the different rounds of WTO talks, a clear pattern emerges: multilateral trade agreements have become increasingly intricate, yet they remain vital for managing interdependence in the world economy. Looking ahead, the challenge is to adapt and strengthen this system so that it continues to promote shared prosperity, addresses new issues like digital trade and climate change, and remains fair to members at all levels of development. Each past round offers lessons in compromise, the importance of updating rules with the times, and the need for patience and persistence in achieving global economic cooperation.

1. Examine how the principle of special and differential treatment has influenced developing countries’ participation in WTO negotiations over the years. (250 words)
2. Assess the reasons for the prolonged deadlock in the Doha Round and its implications for multilateralism in global trade. (250 words)
3. Evaluate the impact of the Uruguay Round outcomes on India’s trade policies and domestic regulatory reforms. (250 words)